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INTRODUCTION
1

“Social enterprise” is on the rise. Many individuals today
boast that they are “social entrepreneurs” running “social
2
enterprises,” yet there is no universally accepted legal meaning of
3
the term “social enterprise.” Popularly defined, social enterprise
means using traditional business methods to accomplish charitable
or socially beneficial objectives.
Social enterprise is quasicharitable. It is a hybrid. It is neither entirely profit-driven nor
entirely philanthropic. Social enterprise may be conducted by
either for-profit organizations or nonprofit organizations. Rather
than being defined by any particular type of legal entity or
1. See Adam Bluestein, Six Ways to Save the World: A Practical Guide to Social
Entrepreneurship, INC. MAG., May 2011, at 71, 71.
2. A recent Internet search for the term “social enterprise” produced
24,000,000 hits, including a Wikipedia article.
See, e.g., Social Enterprise,
WIKIPEDIA.COM, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_enterprise (last visited Oct.
30, 2011). National organizations are emerging to support social enterprise. See,
e.g., SOC. ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, https://www.se-alliance.org (last visited Oct. 30,
2011) (providing a range of services and information as a membership
organization for social enterprises and related organizations); THE HUB,
http://the-hub.net (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (hosting the websites for twenty-six
offices worldwide).
3. MARC J. LANE, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: EMPOWERING MISSION-DRIVEN
ENTREPRENEURS 1 (2011); Allen R. Bromberger, A New Type of Hybrid, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV., Spring 2011, at 49; Rosemary E. Fei, A Guide to Social Enterprise
Vehicles, TAX’N EXEMPTS, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 37, 37; Robert A. Wexler, Effective Social
Enterprise—A Menu of Legal Structures, 63 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 565, 565 (2009).
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construct, a social enterprise is any organization that generates
recurring revenue and that coextensively (not subordinately) benefits
4
society at large.
Because of their inherent contract-like flexibility, liability
protection, and malleable tax treatment, limited liability companies
5
are increasingly being used for social enterprise. Another reason
limited liability companies are better suited for social enterprise
than other types of business organizations is that under the laws of
most states, a limited liability company may have “any lawful
6
purpose,” including a charitable purpose. The virtually unlimited
4. See Linda O. Smiddy, Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C & Other
Developments in Social Entrepreneurship, 35 VT. L. REV. 3 (2010). This article does not
attempt to define “social enterprise” any more than it might attempt to define
what is “socially beneficial.” Such precision is not important to this article’s
hypothesis. For a very lucid explanation, however, of what generally is meant by
use of the term “social enterprise,” see id. at 5–6. Professor Smiddy writes:
The working definition . . . is that a social enterprise is one organized
and operated for the dual purposes of engaging in profit-making activity
and furthering a social good. The dual purposes must at least be coequal. If they are not, then the balance between the two must weigh in
favor of furthering the charitable goal. Yet, the balance must not be
tipped so far that the profit-making activity is only incidental to serving
eleemosynary objectives, with the company’s revenues depending
primarily on grants, PRIs, and private donations.
Social enterprises therefore occupy the middle range of a continuum
extending from the traditional for-profit company that only secondarily
serves social purposes to the traditional charitable not-for-profit
organization that serves social purposes exclusively and relies significantly
on grants, donations, and PRIs for funding. Companies at either end of
this spectrum are excluded from the definition of social enterprise. For
example, many commercial enterprises are not social enterprises even
though they donate to charity, provide health and pension benefits to
their employees, and in other ways serve the communities in which they
do business. In these cases, furthering a social good is secondary to
advancing commercial objectives, although these companies may be
good corporate citizens and although providing needed goods and
services is a social benefit.
This definition of social enterprise also excludes not-for-profit
enterprises formed for the sole purpose of serving a social purpose and
whose financial well being depends primarily on grants, PRIs, and private
donations even if the organization occasionally engages in profit-making
activities, as, for example, a library that sponsors book sales to raise
money. However, a charitable organization engaging in significant
profit-making activities to support and further its social mission would be
considered a social enterprise.
Id. at 5–6.
5. Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84
TUL. L. REV. 337, 370–71 (2009).
6. Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes” on
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ability to create varying classes of membership interests with varying
voting and economic rights also makes limited liability companies
7
appealing for social enterprise.
As additional evidence of this trend toward the use of limited
liability companies for social enterprise, witness the promulgation
of so-called “low-profit limited liability company,” or “L3C,” statutes
since 2008. As of the date of publication of this article, nine states
8
have enacted L3C legislation. The L3C is a special type of limited
liability company designed to facilitate the flow of both private and
philanthropic capital to ventures that further a charitable or
educational purpose but that may be profitable as well. Although
an L3C is a for-profit entity and is neither tax-exempt nor eligible
to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions, it is required by
statute to have a primary purpose of furthering a charitable or
educational mission and not maximizing profits. In this manner,
the L3C is intended to encourage private foundations (as distinct
9
from public charities) to make certain expenditures that qualify as
program-related investments, or “PRIs,” under the Internal
10
Revenue Code. On the other hand, the L3C enjoys no special tax
the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 897 n.82 (2010)
(quoting REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 104(b) (2006)).
7. See Cassady V. Brewer & Michael J. Rhim, Using the ‘L3C’ for Program-Related
Investments, TAX’N EXEMPTS, Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 11, 16.
8. CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES:
TAX AND BUSINESS LAW ¶ 1.09[4][g] tbl.1.3 (1994 & Supp. 2011-1). See generally
Bromberger, supra note 3, at 50 (explaining the purpose and utility of a “lowprofit” limited liability company, or L3C). Rhode Island’s L3C statute is not
effective until July 1, 2012. 2011 R.I. Pub. Laws 11-079.
9. Organizations that are organized and operated exclusively for charitable,
religious, educational, or other specified purposes are generally exempt from
income tax under I.R.C. § 501(a) as organizations described in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
I.R.C. § 509(a) divides I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations into two subcategories:
private foundations and organizations that are not private foundations, which are
commonly known as public charities. To be categorized as a public charity and
not a private foundation, an organization must be described in I.R.C. § 509(a). To
be described in I.R.C. § 509(a)(1) or (2), an organization must receive a
substantial amount of broad-based public support to fund its operations. I.R.C. §
509(a)(1) and (2) contain certain rules that test whether an organization’s
support is broad-based and therefore “public.” To be described in I.R.C. §
509(a)(3), an organization must have a particular type of structural relationship
with a publicly supported § 501(c)(3), (4), (5), or (6) organization. See I.R.C. §
509(a) (2011).
10. PRIs are special types of investments available to private foundations
under narrow circumstances. See I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2011); Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3
(2011). With respect to the L3C statutes, the precise language varies among the
several states that have enacted legislation, but essentially, an L3C must meet the
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status under federal law, and therefore many commentators argue
that the L3C is no more useful in facilitating PRIs than an ordinary
11
limited liability company. Even though there is a fairly vigorous,
12
ongoing debate about the usefulness of the L3C, both the
proponents and opponents generally recognize that PRIs are
underutilized and that limited liability companies offer a unique
opportunity to blend private and philanthropic dollars in a manner
13
that is encouraged by the PRI rules.
“B corporations” are another indicator of the rise of social
enterprise. B corporations are for-profit business organizations
that have been certified by B Lab (a Pennsylvania-based nonprofit
organization), as serving social and environmental purposes, along
14
with generating profits and shareholder value. Put another way, a
B corporation responds to the demands of stakeholders, not just
shareholders, and stakeholders include employees, vendors, and
the community at large, as well as shareholders. The phrase “doing
well by doing good” often is overused, but in the case of B
same requirements that are imposed upon PRIs qualifying under I.R.C. § 4944(c):
(1) the entity must “further the accomplishment of a charitable or educational
purpose within the meaning I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B)”; (2) the entity “would not have
been formed but for its relationship to the accomplishment of a charitable or
educational purpose”; (3) the entity has no significant purpose of “the production
of income or the appreciation of property”; and (4) the entity has no “political or
legislative purpose within the meaning of I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D).” Brewer & Rhim,
supra note 7, at 13; see infra Part IV.B (discussing PRIs in greater detail). See
generally BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8, ¶ 1.09[4][a] (discussing the L3C
historical architecture).
11. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8, ¶ 1.09[4][f].
12. Compare Brewer & Rhim, supra note 7; Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The
Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV. 59 (2010); Kelley, supra note 5; Robert Lang
& Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L3C, History, Basic Concept, and Legal Framework,
35 VT. L. REV. 15 (2010); John Tyler, Negating the Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A
Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117 (2010); and
Wexler, supra note 3, with Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program
Related Investment By Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243 (2010); J. William
Callison, L3Cs: Useless Gadgets, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov.–Dec. 2009, available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2009-11-12/nonbindingopinions.shtml;
J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited
Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in
Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273 (2010); James Hines Jr. et al., The Attack
on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179 (2010);
Kleinberger, supra note 6; and David Edward Spenard, Panacea or Problem: A State
Regulator’s Perspective on the L3C Model, 65 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 131 (2010).
13. Luther M. Ragin, Jr., Program-Related Investments in Practice, 35 VT. L. REV.
53, 53 (2010).
14. See About Certified B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., http://www.bcorporation
.net/about (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5

2012]

A NOVEL APPROACH

683

corporations, it perhaps fits.
To earn B corporation status, a business organization must
achieve and maintain a certain score on a scale developed by B
15
Lab. Scoring is based upon numerous factors such as facilitating
employee ownership, providing retirement and health plans,
encouraging sustainability and other environmentally friendly
16
practices, and serving the community. B Lab monitors and audits
its B corporations to ensure that they continue to meet the
17
requirements for certification. As the reader might suspect, in
order to be certified, a B corporation must pay B Lab a yearly
licensing fee calculated on the basis of the corporation’s annual
18
sales.
B corporations generally do not have any special legal status.
Rather, B corporation certification is more akin to a good business
seal of approval. Furthermore, despite their name, B corporations
are not confined strictly to state-law corporations. Limited liability
companies (including L3Cs) and partnerships may qualify as “B
19
corporations” as well.
In addition, somewhat akin to B corporations, yet different
because they are creatures of statute rather than license, “benefit”
corporations recently have been authorized by a few states. In
particular, a “benefit” corporation is not merely a unique brand of
business, but instead is a state-law corporation with the following
special features: (1) the corporation’s charter specifies that it is
formed to pursue a social purpose, (2) the corporation has at least
one “benefit” director on its board who is charged with carrying out
the corporation’s mission without regard to profit, (3) the
corporation is certified by an independent third-party agency as
compliant with the agency’s social benefit rating standards, and (4)
15. See
The
B
Impact
Rating
System,
CERTIFIED
B
CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/become/BRS (follow “How are companies Certified
and Audited as B Corporations?” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
16. B Impact Assessment 2010 Version 2.0, CERTIFIED B CORP. (2010),
http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/2010-B-ImpactAssessment%20(1).pdf (providing an example of the factors that are important
when rating manufacturing businesses with more than thirty employees where the
factors may vary depending on the nature of the business completing the survey).
17. The B Impact Rating System, supra note 15.
18. About Certified B Corps, supra note 14; Make It Official, CERTIFIED B CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/become/official (last visited Oct. 30, 2011); see also
Wexler, supra note 3.
19. A limited liability company is hereinafter referred to in this article as an
“LLC.”
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the corporation issues an annual report detailing its
accomplishments with respect to fulfilling its social mission. If a
benefit corporation meets the above requirements, then its
directors are protected from liability for decisions that advance the
corporation’s social mission, even if such decisions sacrifice profit.
Moreover, Maryland not only authorizes “benefit” corporations, but
also authorizes “benefit” limited liability companies. “Benefit”
limited liability companies essentially must meet the same special
20
requirements as “benefit” corporations.
Despite its potential, however, a single, free-standing LLC—
even a beneficial LLC that simultaneously is a B corporation, or
even an L3C that simultaneously is a B corporation—created to
own and operate a social enterprise often does not meet all the
21
legal-entity needs of the typical social entrepreneur. The reason
LLCs, L3Cs, B corporations, and benefit corporations alone do not
meet these needs is because the typical social entrepreneur wants
the tax and capital-raising advantages of both the for-profit and the
nonprofit worlds. That is, like most other businesses, social
entrepreneurs desperately need capital, but because of their hybrid
22
nature, they generally cannot access normal financing sources.
Ordinary for-profit enterprises access capital through commercial
loans and private investment. Nonprofit organizations can and do
20. As of the date of submission of this article for publication, six states
reportedly have enacted beneficial corporation legislation: California, Hawaii,
Maryland, New Jersey, Vermont, and Virginia. For additional information, see
Maureen Gorsen, California Governor Signs Bills Creating New Corporate Entity for
Environmentally/Socially Responsible Companies, LEXOLOGY.COM (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2290373f-add9-4865-bbb41cce30dbff87&l=7FWRH05; see also Senate Bill 595, An Act Concerning Corporations –
Limited Liability Companies – Election to be a Benefit Corporation: Hearing on Senate Bill
595 Before the S. Judicial Proceedings Comm., (Md. 2011) (statement of Laura E.
Jordan, Esq., The Capital Law Firm), available at http://www
.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/ded/pdf/b-corp-testimony_Senate.pdf;
Benefit Corporation – Legal Provisions and FAQs, CERTIFIED B CORP.,
http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/Benefit%
20Corporation%20-%20Legal%20Provisions%20and%20FAQ.pdf (last visited Oct.
30, 2011).
21. See generally Bromberger, supra note 3; J. Haskell Murray & Edward I.
Hwang, Governance, Enforcement, and Capital-Raising in the Low-Profit Limited Liability
Company, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 601 (2011) (outlining the potential drawbacks a
social entrepreneur may face in starting an LLC); Wexler, supra note 3 (discussing
factors relevant to the choice of tax structure for a new legal enterprise).
22. Arthur Wood, New Legal Structures to Address the Social Capital Famine, 35
VT. L. REV. 45, 46 (2010) (noting the lack of financing options that allow
organizations to move from the not-for-profit world into the for-profit world).
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borrow money, but they do not permit private investment and,
thus, rely upon grants and charitable contributions for much of
23
their capital needs. PRIs offer some hope to combine private and
philanthropic dollars, but with the exception of a small number of
sophisticated and relatively large private foundations, most private
foundations will not undertake a PRI and prefer to engage in
traditional grant-making to other charitable organizations. Thus,
rather than being hybrids, social enterprises are orphans when it
24
comes to ready sources of capital.
Desperately in need of capital, a social entrepreneur therefore
dreams about a legal vehicle that not only allows private ownership
and investment, but one that also may receive private foundation
grants and charitable contributions. Currently, there is no such
25
legal entity. LLCs and L3Cs are flexible but not flexible enough
to completely blend within one entity the best attributes of both
for-profit and nonprofit organizations. It is possible, though, to
create a structure that makes use of multiple organizations acting
in concert to achieve the goal of blending philanthropic and
private dollars to fund a social enterprise. These multiple entity
26
structures have been referred to as “contract hybrids.”
This article proposes one such novel “contract hybrid” for
social enterprise. The “contract hybrid” described herein makes
use of multiple LLCs to achieve, to the extent reasonably possible,
the “best of both worlds” for a hypothetical social enterprise
project. This new, unique structure relies heavily on the flexible
nature of the LLC, particularly the LLC’s ability to accommodate
competing legal rights and duties among members with very
diverse objectives. The “contract hybrid” described in this article
also exploits the extraordinarily malleable nature of LLCs with
respect to their income tax treatment. Finally, the keystone to the
structure described herein is a relatively recent Internal Revenue
23. Bromberger, supra note 3, at 49.
24. This may change soon. In November 2010, J.P. Morgan released an
extensive report entitled Impact Investments: An Emerging Asset Class. Nick
O’Donohoe et al., Impact Investments: An Emerging Asset Class, J.P. MORGAN GLOBAL
RES., Nov. 29, 2010, at 5, available at http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename
=JPM/DirectDoc&urlname=impact_investments_nov2010.pdf. Defining impact
investments as investments that “create positive impact beyond financial return,”
the report further stated that due to the demands of its wealthy clients, “impact
investing will reveal itself to be one of the most powerful changes within the asset
management industry in the years to come.” Id. at 13.
25. Bromberger, supra note 3, at 49.
26. Id.
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Service information letter that permits private foundations to make
grants directly to wholly owned LLC subsidiaries of public
27
charities.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part II sets forth a
hypothetical social enterprise project in need of capital. Part III
summarizes the principal advantages and disadvantages of using a
nonprofit entity to pursue the project. Part IV summarizes the
principal advantages and disadvantages of using a for-profit entity
to pursue the project. Finally, Part V describes a new, proposed
“contract hybrid” LLC structure that potentially reconciles the
competing for-profit and nonprofit capital and other demands of
the project.
II. THE PEOPLE’S MARKET
The city of Terminus has had a history of separate
neighborhoods for the “haves” and the “have-nots.” Generally
speaking, the “haves” live in the suburbs while the “have-nots” live
within the city limits. Due to increasing traffic, rising gas prices,
and baby-boomers turned empty nesters, however, more affluent
individuals are selling their suburban homes and moving into
condominiums and other multi-family housing units within the
Terminus city limits. This shift from suburban to in-town living has
led to substantial redevelopment within Terminus with some of the
new, affluent developments bordering upon neighborhoods that
are economically disadvantaged and deteriorating.
Seeing the trend toward urban living, Sam Developer is
interested in acquiring a large, abandoned warehouse that is
located between a new, multi-family development and a historically
poor, troubled neighborhood. The warehouse also borders the
campus of Terminus College, or “TC,” a small, private college with
approximately five thousand students. Sam’s vision is to acquire
the warehouse, restore it, and then turn the warehouse into “The
People’s Market,” a large, open-air structure with many small retail
businesses operating under one roof. The People’s Market
primarily expects to attract local farmers and other food vendors,
but all types of small retail businesses will be welcome. Each retail
28
business that locates in The People’s Market will rent space in the
27. I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2010-0052 (June 25, 2010).
28. For the sake of brevity, this article ignores whether the legal relationship
between TPM Owner and each retail business is properly characterized as that of
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warehouse from Sam’s to-be-formed company, which he tentatively
is calling “TPM Owner.” Further, Sam will insist that the tenants
conduct their businesses in an environmentally conscious manner
and that most of the food sold at The People’s Market be organic
and locally grown. To set an example, Sam intends to implement a
state of the art recycling system and install solar panels on the roof
of The People’s Market.
The rental payments each tenant will pay TPM Owner will
consist of substantially below-market base rent plus additional rent
determined by the net revenues of each particular tenant. Sam’s
intent by offering lease rates that are heavily tied to net revenue is
to entice the residents of the nearby poor neighborhood to
become the principal business owners and tenants of The People’s
Market. In turn, Sam expects that these new business owners will
create jobs and spur positive economic development for the entire
area.
More than just being a community marketplace and a jobcreation vehicle, though, Sam wants The People’s Market to
transform the way small retailers do business in order to benefit the
nearby poor, troubled neighborhood. In particular, Sam has
decided that each tenant’s lease with TPM Owner will require the
retailer to participate in a “name-your-price” program that, on an
alternating basis, allows customers to pay any amount they believe
is “fair” when buying products and services at that retailer’s
establishment. Thus, during any given month, a small portion of
the retailers in The People’s Market will sell their goods and
services for whatever price a customer desires to pay. Each retailer
will have suggested prices for the goods or services offered, but
during the month the retailer is part of the “name-your-price”
program, each customer may pay whatever price he or she feels is
29
Sam believes the “name-your-price” program will
appropriate.
landlord-tenant or as licensor-licensee. Although important in practice, the
distinction between the two relationships is not particularly relevant to the analysis
in this article.
29. There is precedent for such a program. In 2010, Panera Bread Company
began conducting a “pay-as-you-go” experiment at some of its outlets where
customers could pay more or less than the retail value of their meals. These
Panera Cares Community Cafes, run by the Panera Bread Foundation, have been a
success, according to the former CEO and board chairman Ron Schaich. The
foundation reported that sixty percent to seventy percent of the Panera Cares
customers pay full price, while fifteen percent pay more and the rest pay less or
nothing. See Valerie Killifer, Panera Bread Prepares to Open Third Pay-As-You-Go,
FASTCASUAL.COM (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.fastcasual.com/article/178719
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greatly benefit the adjacent poor, troubled neighborhood as the
residents there will be able to acquire many of the goods and
services they need for free or at a deeply discounted price. Of
course, to prevent abuse of the program, the leases with TPM
Owner will provide that each retailer has the right to refuse to sell
30
goods or provide services in appropriate circumstances. Sam also
anticipates creating an internship program so business students at
TC interested in innovative business models can work at and learn
from The People’s Market as well as the retailers located therein.
Sam projects that it will cost $10 million to acquire and restore
the warehouse and construct the necessary improvements to
accommodate various retail businesses. Sam has created a detailed
business plan that addresses both the financial aspects of acquiring
and operating The People’s Market as well as the “social good”
(e.g., job creation, community revitalization, environmental
sustainability, and assisting the poor) that will be accomplished by
the project. Despite the challenges The People’s Market project
presents, Sam is confident he can raise $4 million for the project
from friends and family, but to do so, Sam must find a way to
finance, at a competitive inter`est rate, the remaining $6 million.
Sam has approached numerous banks, pension funds, insurance
companies, and other sources of conventional real estate capital,
but no one is willing to provide Sam $6 million on any terms, much
less at a “competitive” rate. Every normal capital source that Sam
approaches believes the project is much too risky and the “nameyour-price” program in particular dooms the project to failure.
Nevertheless, Sam remains undaunted and unwilling to
compromise his vision for The People’s Market.
Fortunately for Sam, the Terminus Community Foundation, a
31
local public charity that also sponsors a donor-advised fund, has
/Panera-Bread-prepares-to-open-third-pay-as-you-go; see also Press Release, Panera
Bread Foundation, Inc., Panera Bread Foundation Opens Third Panera Cares
Community Cafe in Portland, OR (Jan. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.panerabread.com/pdf/pr-20110116.pdf (announcing the opening of
a new cafe and explaining the concept behind Panera Bread’s “pay-as-you-go”
experiment).
30. For example, items that cost the retailer more than ten dollars per item
might be exempt from the “name-your-price” program. Furthermore, customers
that return again and again to purchase items but never offer to pay at all could be
refused service.
31. Prior to the Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-208, 120 Stat.
780, the Internal Revenue Code did not define the term “donor-advised fund.”
Nevertheless, the term commonly was understood to refer to component funds of
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taken a great interest in The People’s Market project. The
Community Foundation is interested in the project not only for the
potential benefit to the adjacent poor neighborhood and its
residents, and for the internship program with TC, but also
because the Community Foundation believes that many of the
retail businesses opening in The People’s Market will be eligible to
obtain partially guaranteed Small Business Administration loans
through another local charitable organization, Terminus
32
The Community
Community Loan Fund, Inc., or “TCLF.”
Foundation and its members have been long-time supporters of
TCLF, and Sam’s project seems well-suited for the mission of TCLF.
In addition, the Community Foundation and its members also have
supported TC in the past, and The People’s Market is expected to
benefit TC and its students as well.
Nevertheless, the Community Foundation itself cannot provide
the $6 million in financing that Sam needs. As a sponsor of a
donor-advised fund, the Community Foundation is established
primarily to make grants to other charitable organizations at the
direction of its donor-advisors, not to fund projects like The
People’s Market. The Community Foundation also is subject to a
number of special, complex tax rules applicable to donor-advised
33
funds that inhibit the Community Foundation’s ability to make
such a loan. Likewise, although its mission would extend to
providing debt financing for The People’s Market, TCLF does not
have the funds to make such a large commercial real estate loan.
certain community trusts. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(10), (11) (2010). The
term also typically was used “to refer to an account established by one or more
donors but owned and controlled by a public charity to which such donors or
other individuals designated by the donors could provide nonbinding
recommendations regarding distributions from the account or regarding
investment of the assets in the account.” I.R.S. Notice 2006-109, 2006-2 C.B. 1121,
superseded in part by Rev. Proc. 2009-32, 2009-28 I.R.B. 142. In many respects, then,
donor-advised funds operated, and continue to operate, in a manner similar to
private foundations, but the privileges of the donor are in an advisory role only
and do not legally bind the public charity. See id.
32. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 81-284, 1981-2 C.B. 130 (stating that a nonprofit small
business investment company licensed under § 301(d) of the Small Business
Investment Act of 1958 may qualify for exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)). For
general information regarding the Small Business Administration’s loan programs,
see SBA Loan Programs, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., www.sba.gov/category/navigationstructure/loans-grants/small-business-loans/sba-loan-programs (last visited Oct.
30, 2011).
33. I.R.C. § 4966 (2006). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying
notes 225–33.
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TC also does not have the funds to make the $6 million loan, even
if it could justify such an investment as part of its educational
mission.
Although neither the Community Foundation, TCLF, nor TC
can provide the remaining $6 million in necessary capital for The
People’s Market project, Terminus is home to a number of
34
successful private foundations, several of which are focused upon
alleviating poverty and supporting community revitalization.
Through the efforts of the Community Foundation, TCLF, and TC,
two of these private foundations have committed to provide $3
million each to fulfill the $6 million of remaining capital that Sam
needs to open The People’s Market. Despite their size and
sophistication, though, these two private foundations always have
35
been traditional, grant-making foundations, and neither has ever
made a PRI or any other grant requiring the exercise of
36
“expenditure responsibility” under § 4945.
Moreover, neither foundation is willing to make an outright
grant to TCLF, thereby allowing TCLF to either re-grant or loan $6
million to TPM Owner for The People’s Market project. Instead,
each foundation desires to monitor the project closely throughout
the process of acquiring the warehouse, renovating it, and then
leasing space to the retail tenants. Unless the foundations have
approval rights and are satisfied that The People’s Market is indeed
following Sam’s business plan as promised, they will cease to
provide funds for the project.
To complicate matters further, the two foundations desire to
34. As noted at supra note 9, although private foundations also are
organizations described in I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), because they are not described in
I.R.C. § 509(a), private foundations are subject to a different regime of taxes than
are public charities. For example, private foundations are subject to an excise tax
if they do not make at least a minimum level of qualifying distributions each year.
See I.R.C. § 4940 (2006 & Supp. III 2007–2010). Private foundations also are
subject to an excise tax if they make certain “taxable expenditures” (i.e., improper
grants or other disbursements). See I.R.C. § 4945 (2006). Taxable expenditures
include, but are not limited to, certain grants to organizations unless the private
foundation exercises “expenditure responsibility” (i.e., due diligence in
investigating, monitoring, and reporting the expenditure) with respect to the
grants. See id. § 4945(h); Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b) (2010).
35. Most private foundations do not engage in charitable activities directly;
rather, they support the charitable activities of public charities by making periodic
grants to those organizations. They usually do not make grants to individuals or
for-profit organizations.
36. See I.R.C. § 4945(d), (h) (2011). For further discussion, see infra text
accompanying notes 160–62.
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participate in The People’s Market project in slightly different ways.
One of the participating foundations, Foundation One, is willing to
enter into a conditional pledge agreement with TCLF agreeing to
grant up to $3 million provided certain conditions (as specified in
the pledge agreement) are met over time as the warehouse is
acquired and renovated. The other foundation, Foundation Two,
is not as well-funded as Foundation One and therefore desires to
loan its $3 million to TCLF as a line of credit allowing draws over
time if, in the discretion of Foundation Two, the project is
proceeding according to plan.
Although Foundation Two’s
commitment is a line of credit subject to repayment, Foundation
Two has agreed that it will be an interest-free loan.
So, how does Sam create a legal structure that combines the $4
million in private investment dollars from his friends and family
with the $6 million in philanthropic dollars committed by the two
local, private foundations so that he can build The People’s
Market? Parts III and IV of this article explore both the nonprofit
and for-profit options, while Part V proposes a “contract hybrid” to
accomplish Sam’s objectives.
III. TPM OWNER AS A TAX-EXEMPT NONPROFIT
It likely would be possible to form TPM Owner as a nonprofit
corporation and then obtain tax-exempt status from the Internal
37
Revenue Service. Although it is difficult to uncover the precise
37. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-419, 1976-2 C.B. 146 (stating that an industrial park
giving rental preference to employers hiring previously unemployed workers
qualifies for exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)); Rev. Rul. 76-147, 1976-1 C.B.
151 (stating that an organization formed to improve conditions in an area of a city
where income is higher and housing is better than other areas nonetheless can
qualify as exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) because it counteracts housing
deterioration); Rev. Rul. 70-585, 1970-2 C.B. 115 (discussing a nonprofit
organization, qualifying for exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), formed to
revitalize a particular area of a city, part of its plans involve the purchase of an
apartment building that it will rehabilitate and lease to low- and moderate-income
families in the area); Rev. Rul. 68-167, 1968-1 C.B. 255 (stating that a nonprofit
organization establishing a market for products made by disabled individuals may
qualify for exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)); Rev. Rul. 67-138, 1967-1 C.B. 129
(stating that a nonprofit organization created to provide low-income families
instruction and guidance regarding building their own homes may qualify for
exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)); Chasing the Coveted (c)(3), FARMERS MKT.
COAL. (Jan. 13, 2010), http://farmersmarketcoalition.org/501c3. But see Rev. Rul.
78-131, 1978 C.B. 157 (stating that an annual community art show is not exempt
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), but is exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)); Rev. Rul. 71395, 1971-2 C.B. 223 (stating that a cooperative art gallery selling works of
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nature of the operations of exempt farmers’ market organizations
through Internet research, the Internal Revenue Service has
granted § 501(c)(3) exempt status to at least sixty organizations
38
that use the terms “farmers market” in their names. To secure
tax-exempt status, Sam might need to modify his vision for The
People’s Market somewhat—such as by offering regular
educational programs on entrepreneurship, environmental
sustainability, or organic farming, and emphasizing serving the
poor and disadvantaged—but tax-exempt status from the Internal
39
Revenue Service would appear to be realistic.
A. Principal Advantages of Forming TPM Owner as a Tax-Exempt
Nonprofit
Assuming that TPM Owner is formed as a state-law nonprofit
corporation (“TPM Owner, Inc.”) that obtains tax-exempt status
40
under § 501(c)(3), what are the principal advantages of doing so?
First and foremost, TPM Owner, Inc. will be exempt from
41
federal and, generally, state income taxes. Depending upon the
jurisdiction, this exemption can extend to sales taxes and property
42
taxes, as well as income taxes. In addition, anyone contributing
money or property to TPM Owner, Inc. usually will be entitled to
claim a charitable contribution deduction for federal and state
43
income tax purposes. If formed as a public charity, TPM Owner,
participants is not exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)); Rev. Rul. 67-430, 1967-2 C.B.
220 (stating that a cooperative farmers’ market is exempt under I.R.C. § 521);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200833031 (Aug. 15, 2008) (stating that a farmers’ and
artisans’ market is not exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200818028 (May 2, 2008) (stating, similarly, that a farmers’ and artisans’ market is
not exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
38. See Search for Charities, Online Version of Publication 78, I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF
THE
TREASURY, http://www.irs.gov/app/pub-78/forwardToSearch.do (enter
“farmers market”—without a possessive apostrophe—in the search field to return
the proper results) (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
39. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (2010)
(defining education to include “museums, zoos, planetariums, symphony
orchestras, and other similar organizations”). The Internal Revenue Service is
hereinafter referred to as the “Service.”
40. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). See generally FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M.
MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS ¶ 1.01 (2010) (describing the
convergence of activities of exempt and non-exempt organizations).
41. See, e.g., HILL & MANCINO, supra note 40, ¶ 1.01 (discussing the effect of
classification under the Internal Revenue Code).
42. See id. ¶ 2.01.
43. See I.R.C. § 170(a) (2006).
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Inc. will be eligible to receive grants from private foundations and,
44
possibly, government grants. There also is an overall “halo” effect
when an organization is bestowed tax-exempt status by the Service.
Being tax-exempt, the public thus would presume that TPM
Owner, Inc. operates for the benefit of society at large, not
45
primarily for private interests.
There are non-tax advantages of nonprofit status as well. For
instance, debt instruments issued by a nonprofit can qualify for an
46
Volunteers
exemption from federal and state securities laws.
serving nonprofit organizations generally are exempt from the Fair
47
Labor Standards Act, although they must be true volunteers.
Charitable immunity laws in some states protect nonprofits and
volunteers of nonprofits from certain categories of tort liability
48
Like their for-profit
arising out of their charitable activities.
counterparts, nonprofit corporations provide liability protection
49
for those individuals conducting the activities of the organization.
TPM Owner, Inc. would benefit from these non-tax advantages.
B. Principal Disadvantages of Forming TPM Owner as a Tax-Exempt
Nonprofit
There are a number of significant disadvantages associated
with being a tax-exempt nonprofit.
One very significant
disadvantage is the additional administrative and regulatory burden
that accompanies exempt status.
For instance, the Service
estimates that it takes approximately ninety hours of recordkeeping
50
time to complete the Form 1023, Application for Exempt Status.
There also normally is an $850 fee payable to the Service in
51
The fee usually is not
connection with filing the application.

44. See, e.g., HILL & MANCINO, supra note 40, ¶ 8.02 (describing public
charities as a “favored class” with regard to fundraising); see also Wexler, supra note
3, at 575 (indicating that governments may provide grants where organizations
relieve government burdens).
45. LANE, supra note 3, at 66.
46. MARILYN E. PHELAN, 2 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: LAW AND TAXATION §
14:26 (2010), available at Westlaw NPOLT § 14:26.
47. LANE, supra note 3, at 28.
48. 2 PHELAN, supra note 46, § 14.8.
49. Id. § 14.7; LANE, supra note 3, at 84.
50. See I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1023
APPLICATION FOR RECOGNITION OF EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 501(C)(3) OF THE
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, CAT. NO. 17132Z, 24 (Nov. 2006).
51. Rev. Proc. 2011-8, 2011-1 I.R.B. 237, § 6.07(2).
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52

refundable, even if exempt status is denied. Moreover, in a few
jurisdictions, a separate state application must be submitted as
53
well. Even after exempt status is obtained, completing and filing
the annual Form 990, Return of Organizations Exempt from
54
Income Tax, generally is a very time-consuming task.
Furthermore, once filed, the Form 990 is required to be made
55
In fact, certain companies are in the
public upon request.
business of obtaining Form 990s and making the forms available to
56
The Form 990 includes a great deal of potentially
the public.
sensitive information, including compensation of top executives
57
Note as well that tax-exempt
and payments to affiliates.
58
organizations nevertheless remain liable for employment taxes,
59
60
and in some states, property taxes, and sales taxes. Furthermore,
because of the unique nature of its rental income, TPM Owner,
Inc. conceivably could be subject to the unrelated business income
61
tax even though it otherwise is tax-exempt.
There are a host of other special tax rules as well that can
apply to a tax-exempt organization. These rules are designed to
safeguard against the use of tax-exempt status to benefit private
interests controlling or doing business with an exempt
organization. These special rules include prohibitions on private
62
Certain other
inurement, private benefit, and excess benefits.
rules generally prohibit or restrict exempt organizations from
63
engaging in political and lobbying activities.
Non-tax disadvantages of operating as a nonprofit include
52. Id. § 10.01.
53. See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 40, ¶ 2.01.
54. Id. ¶ 8.02.
55. I.R.C. § 6104(d) (2011). See generally HILL & MANCINO, supra note 40, ¶
33.08.
56. See generally CHARITY NAVIGATOR, www.charitynavigator.org (last visited
Oct. 30, 2011); GUIDESTAR, www.guidestar.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
57. See, e.g., I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 990, RETURN OF
ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME, CAT. NO. 11282Y, 7 (2010) (providing the
proper form with which to claim exemptions from income taxes under § 501(c)).
58. Daniel B. Rosenbaum, Federal and State Governments Target Employment Tax
Compliance, TAX’N EXEMPTS, Sept.–Oct. 2010, at 19, 19.
59. See Gil A. Nusbaum, Weighing the Options on State and Local Property Taxes,
TAX’N EXEMPTS, July–Aug. 2007, at 18, 18.
60. Steven Chiodini & Gregory L. Colvin, The Use of LLCs in Fiscal
Sponsorship—A New Model, TAX’N EXEMPTS, May–June 2011, at 15, 15.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 126–44.
62. See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 40, ¶ 4.01.
63. Id. ¶ 5.02.
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regulation by each state’s attorney general and special rules across
64
Perhaps most
all fifty states that govern fundraising activities.
important of all, nonprofit status does not permit any type of equity
participation in the growth and enterprise value of the
organization. Reasonable compensation and bonuses may be paid
to employees, but nonprofits have no owners and hence all net
earnings remain inside the nonprofit for use in fulfilling the
mission of the organization. Upon liquidation of a nonprofit, the
net proceeds must be distributed to another nonprofit or to the
65
government.
Therefore, in order to adopt the tax-exempt, nonprofit model
for The People’s Market, Sam would have to eliminate any equity
investment by himself and his friends and family. Sam and his
friends and family could donate $4 million to TPM Owner, Inc. and
66
receive a charitable contribution deduction for tax purposes, but
unless they are extraordinarily wealthy and in need of a large
income tax deduction, a donation of such magnitude is not likely.
Tax-exempt, nonprofit status for TPM Owner, Inc. would have the
countervailing benefit of allowing Terminus’s private foundations
67
to make grants, or possibly PRIs, to fund the entire $10 million in
capital needed for The People’s Market; but in the author’s
experience, if the private foundations were willing to fund the
entire capital needs of the project, they likely would demand
control over all aspects of the project’s organization and operation,
meaning that Sam would not necessarily be involved. Moreover,
funding principally through donations and grants is contrary to the
essential nature of social enterprise, which endeavors to be selfsustaining by relying upon recurring revenues without the necessity
68
of charitable contribution dollars.
1.

Participating Debt Issued by TPM Owner, Inc.

Although equity investment in a tax-exempt, nonprofit
organization is not permitted, it is possible for an exempt

64. See 2 PHELAN, supra note 46, § 13.1.
65. See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 40, ¶ 2.02[5].
66. This is subject to numerous requirements that are beyond the scope of
this article. See I.R.C. § 170 (2011).
67. For further discussion on program-related investments (PRIs), see supra
note 10; infra text accompanying notes 150–70.
68. See supra text accompanying note 4.
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organization to borrow money and issue debt instruments. Thus,
if we assume that Sam decides that he can live with all of the above
restrictions with the exception of eliminating himself and his
friends and family as investors in The People’s Market, then the
question arises whether the private investment in TPM Owner, Inc.
might take the form of debt. Would it be possible, for instance, to
launch The People’s Market by raising $6 million in donations,
grants, and charitable loans and raising the remaining $4 million
by issuing subordinated debt instruments to Sam and his friends
and family? These debt instruments might even be structured to
call for a low rate of base interest plus additional “kicker” interest
determined by reference to the cash flow of TPM Owner, Inc. In
other words, the debt instruments issued to Sam and his friends
70
and family perhaps could be equity-like in their terms, thus
allowing the private investors to obtain de facto equity in TPM
Owner, Inc.
As the reader might have guessed, though, creating an equity71
like debt instrument—often referred to as “participating debt” —
that is issued to private investors in a tax-exempt, nonprofit
organization violates several fundamental tax rules and is not
72
Namely, such an arrangement violates the
permitted.
prohibitions on private inurement and private benefit. Even if the
arrangement somehow escaped the private inurement and private
benefit prohibitions, it would be caught by the restrictions on
“excess benefit transactions.” In addition, the unrelated business
income tax rules, especially the rules regarding unrelated debt
financed income, could be problematic.
Even though established law tells us that an exempt
organization cannot issue participating debt, the underlying
reasons why such debt is not permitted are important to
69. If it were not possible, there would be no need for I.R.C. § 514 (2011).
70. See Paul Carman & Kelley Bender, Debt, Equity or Other: Applying a Binary
Analysis in a Multidimensional World, 107 J. TAX’N 17, 26 (2007).
71. See id. at 26–27.
72. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(13)-1(d) (1980) (stating that, with respect to
exempt cemetery organizations but applicable to other exempts as well,
“[participating debt] is considered an interest in the net earnings of [an]
organization” and is not permitted); see also Rev. Rul. 61-137, 1961-2 C.B. 118
(stating that the sale of land at the contingent sales price bars exempt status for
otherwise nonprofit cemetery organization); Rev. Rul. 77-70, 1977-1 C.B. 149
(stating the same); Rev. Rul. 69-279, 1969-1 C.B. 152 (stating that exempt status
will be denied to a charitable trust if payments of percentage of income are made
to the grantor). See generally HILL & MANCINO, supra note 40, ¶¶ 4.03[5][a], 19.06.
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understand for the remainder of this article.
Therefore,
summarized below are the rules relating to private inurement,
private benefit, excess benefit transactions, and unrelated business
taxable income, all of which would be implicated if TPM Owner,
Inc. were to operate as an exempt organization that issued
participating debt to Sam and his friends and family.
2.

Private Inurement

Section 501(c)(3) grants tax-exempt status to an organization
only when “no part of [its] net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of
73
Treasury regulations
any private shareholder or individual.”
define “private shareholder or individual” for purposes of
§ 501(c)(3) as “persons having a personal and private interest in
74
the activities of the organization.” Persons having a personal and
private interest in an exempt organization—as opposed to the
75
general public—are informally referred to as “insiders.” Further,
this prohibition on insiders participating in the net earnings of an
exempt organization generally is referred to as “inurement” or
76
“private inurement.”
The private inurement restriction is intended to differentiate
between improper benefits (typically financial benefits) granted to
insiders versus benefits granted to the public (which may include
insiders) as a natural part of the organization’s exempt purpose.
Thus, the capacity in which an individual receives a financial
benefit from the organization often determines whether private
inurement exists. If a person receives a benefit as part of the
charitable class of intended beneficiaries, as opposed to receiving a
financial benefit in his or her personal capacity, then the private
inurement prohibition usually is not violated and exempt status
77
may be preserved. In addition, reasonable compensation paid to
insiders and others, even where it is tied in part to gross earnings, is
78
permitted under the right circumstances. In general, however, if
73. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c) (2011).
75. See Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1066 (1989).
76. See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 40, ¶ 4.03.
77. See id.
78. For example, in Rev. Rul. 69-383, 1969-2 C.B. 113, the Service allowed
compensation paid to a radiologist based upon a percentage of the adjusted gross
revenues of a radiology department. The Service considered whether private
inurement existed, “but found that (1) the arrangement was negotiated at arm’s
length, (2) the physician had no control over, or management authority with
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private inurement is found to exist, then any amount, no matter
79
how small, can preclude tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3).
Moreover, when the financial relationship between a tax-exempt
entity and its insiders is tantamount to an equity interest in the
80
organization, then per se inurement almost certainly will be found.
3.

Private Benefit

In addition to private inurement, private benefit is another
central principle applicable to tax-exempt organizations. The
private benefit principle derives from the § 501(c)(3) statutory
language mandating that an organization be “organized and
81
Treasury
operated exclusively” for charitable purposes.
regulations relax this restriction slightly by interpreting the term
“exclusively” to mean that an organization must engage “primarily”
82
in activities that accomplish one or more exempt purpose. The
Supreme Court has interpreted this “exclusively” language in a
similar, slightly relaxed manner: “[T]he presence of a single [noncharitable] purpose, if substantial in nature, will destroy the
exemption regardless of the number or importance of truly
83
[charitable] purposes.”
Put differently, then, if more than an insubstantial part of an
organization’s activities is in furtherance of a nonexempt purpose,
84
then it will not qualify under § 501(c)(3). Treasury regulations
elaborate, stating that to be exempt, an organization must establish
that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of: private
respect to the hospital, and (3) the amount received did not represent excessive or
unreasonable compensation for the services actually performed.” I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). The Service cautioned, though, that the
presence of a percentage compensation arrangement will destroy the
organization’s exemption where it essentially is a device for distributing profits to
persons in control. Rev. Rul. 69-383, 1969-2 C.B. 113.
79. Spokane Motorcycle Club v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 151, 153 (E.D.
Wash. 1963) (holding that $825.31 of inurement resulted in revocation of exempt
status). Under more current rules, for small infractions, the Service most likely
would seek to impose so-called “intermediate sanctions” under I.R.C. § 4958
(discussed in more detail infra) rather than revoke an organization’s exempt
status. In egregious cases, though, the Service will pursue revocation of exempt
status.
80. See sources cited supra note 72.
81. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010).
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c) (2011).
83. Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945) (emphasis
added).
84. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c).
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interests such as designated individuals; the creator or his family;
shareholders of the organization; or persons controlled, directly or
85
This private benefit
indirectly, by such private interests.
prohibition applies to all types of individuals and other
organizations, not just “insiders.” Inurement is thus a subset of
private benefit. The Tax Court has said with respect to the private
inurement/private benefit distinction: “[W]hile the prohibitions
against private inurement and private benefits share common and
often overlapping elements, the two are distinct requirements
86
which must independently be satisfied.” The court went on to
state that the presence of private inurement violates both
prohibitions, but the absence of inurement does not mean the
absence of private benefit. Instead, private benefit arises from
“nonincidental benefits conferred on disinterested persons [that]
87
serve private interests.”
Determining whether a benefit flowing to private individuals
precludes exempt status requires balancing. As the Service has
stated:
Any private benefit arising from a particular activity must
be “incidental” in both a qualitative and quantitative sense
to the overall public benefit achieved by the activity if the
organization is to remain exempt. To be qualitatively
incidental, a private benefit must occur as a necessary
concomitant of the activity that benefits the public at
large; in other words, the benefit to the public cannot be
achieved
without
necessarily
benefiting
private
individuals. Such benefits might also be characterized as
indirect or unintentional. To be quantitatively incidental,
a benefit must be insubstantial when viewed in relation to
the public benefit conferred by the activity. It bears
emphasis that, even though exemption of the entire
organization may be at stake, the private benefit conferred
by an activity or arrangement is balanced only against the
public benefit conferred by that activity or arrangement,
88
not the overall good accomplished by the organization.
An example of a qualitatively incidental benefit is found in

85. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1).
86. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1068 (1989) (citations
omitted).
87. Id. at 1069.
88. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 2, 1991).
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89

Revenue Ruling 70-186. There, an organization was formed to
preserve and enhance a lake as a public recreational facility by
treating the water. The lake was large and bordered on several
municipalities. The public used the lake extensively for recreation.
Along its shores were public beaches, launching ramps, and other
public facilities. The organization was financed by contributions
from lake front property owners, members of the adjacent
community, and municipalities bordering the lake. In addressing
the issue of private benefit, the Service concluded in the ruling that
the organization’s activities primarily benefited the general public
through well-maintained and improved public recreational
90
facilities. Any private benefit derived by the lake front property
owners was incidental and was not at the expense of the public
91
benefits flowing from the organization’s operations.
92
In contrast, Revenue Ruling 75-286 describes an organization
formed by the residents of a city block to preserve and beautify that
block, to improve all public facilities within the block, and to
prevent physical deterioration of the block. The organization’s
activities consisted of paying the city government to plant trees on
public property within the block, organizing residents to pick up
litter and refuse in the public streets and on public sidewalks within
the block, and encouraging residents to take an active part in
beautifying the block by planting shrubbery in public areas within
93
Membership in the organization was restricted to
the block.
residents of the block and those owning property or operating
businesses there. The Service concluded in this ruling that the
organization did not qualify for exemption under § 501(c)(3)
because the private interests served were not qualitatively
incidental. In fact, the private benefits were fundamental to the
94
organization’s purpose.
To be quantitatively incidental, private benefit must be
insubstantial in amount. “The private benefit must be compared to
89. Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 129.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210.
93. Id.
94. Id. The organization did qualify, however, under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) as a
social welfare organization. Id. Although exempt, social welfare organizations do
not possess all the tax benefits of an I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organization. For instance,
a contribution to a social welfare organization does not give rise to a charitable
contribution deduction under I.R.C. § 170. See I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2), 501(c)(3)
(2011).
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the public benefit of the specific activity in question, not the public
95
benefit provided by all of the organization’s activities.” The more
precisely one can quantify private benefit, the more likely it is to be
non-incidental. Private benefit also is more likely to be found
96
substantial if the group receiving the benefit is small.
Furthermore, unlike inurement, finding private benefit does not
require that payments for goods or services be unreasonable or
97
exceed fair market value.
98
Revenue Ruling 72-147 provides an example of these latter
aspects of private benefit. In that ruling, a nonprofit organization
was formed to provide low-income housing to families; however,
the organization gave preference for housing to employees of a
separate farm proprietorship owned and operated by the founder
99
of the nonprofit. In addition, all of the housing units were in fact
occupied by employees of the founder’s farm proprietorship. The
Service held that even though providing low-income housing is a
charitable activity, the private benefit bestowed upon the farm
100
proprietorship precluded exemption.
Another important point about private benefit is that, unlike
inurement, an insider need not be involved. Private benefit involves
non-incidental benefits to anyone other than the charitable class
served by the organization’s exempt activities. The court’s holding
101
in Westward Ho v. Commissioner illustrates this point. Westward Ho
was created by three restaurant owners to provide funds to
“indigent and antisocial persons” to enable them to leave
102
The Tax Court concluded that the
Burlington, Vermont.
organization’s true purpose was to provide its creators with a more
desirable business environment by removing disruptive homeless
persons from the area. The organization did not qualify for
exemption even though it provided direct “assistance” to members
103
of a charitable class.
95. ANDREW MEGOSH ET AL., I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PRIVATE
BENEFIT UNDER IRC 501(C)(3) 137 (2001), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstege/eotopich01.pdf.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 138–39 (citing Church by Mail v. Comm’r, 765 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir.
1985), aff’g Est of Haw. v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 1067 (1979)).
98. Rev. Rul. 72-147, 1972-1 C.B. 147.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 2617 (1992).
102. Id.
103. Id.
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104

Similarly, in Revenue Ruling 68-504,
an organization
conducted an educational program for bank employees. It
furnished classrooms and employed university professors and
105
Only
others to teach courses on various banking subjects.
members could take courses, but membership was open to all bank
106
In American Campaign Academy v.
employees in the area.
107
the organization conducted an educational
Commissioner,
program for professional political campaign workers. It furnished
108
Admission was
classrooms, materials, and qualified instructors.
109
through a competitive application process. Both Revenue Ruling
68-504 and American Academy involved organizations pursuing an
exempt activity—education—but the organization in American
Academy in fact was operated to benefit only Republican candidates,
whereas the organization in Revenue Ruling 68-504 benefited
employees from any local bank. If the organization in American
Academy had been non-partisan, it might have qualified for
exemption, whereas had the organization in Revenue Ruling 68504 served only one bank, it probably would not have qualified for
exemption.
4.

Excess Benefit Transactions

Whenever private benefit is found but is not so severe as to
110
permits so-called
justify revocation of exempt status, § 4958
“intermediate sanctions” to be imposed upon an offending
transaction. Specifically, § 4958 imposes certain excise taxes on
“excess benefit transactions” between “disqualified persons” and
tax-exempt organizations described in either § 501(c)(3) or §
111
The excise taxes under § 4958 are punitive in nature
501(c)(4).
so as to discourage certain behavior, and are imposed upon both
the offending “disqualified person” and, if a knowing, willful
104. Rev. Rul. 68-504, 1968-2 C.B. 211.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
108. Id. at 1057.
109. Id. at 1057–58.
110. I.R.C. § 4958 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
111. Id. § 4958(a)(1), (c)(4). Social welfare organizations, like the one
described in Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210, see supra note 90, may qualify for
tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006); but, that status often is not as
beneficial as exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2011). See supra note 94 and
accompanying text.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5

2012]

A NOVEL APPROACH

703

112

violation occurs, management.
The definitions and sub-definitions under § 4958 are
numerous and technical, but for purposes of this article suffice it to
say that a “disqualified person” is any person in position to exercise
(regardless of whether the person actually has exercised)
substantial influence over an exempt organization. Officers,
directors, substantial contributors, key employees, and others with
close ties to an exempt organization thus are disqualified persons.
In addition, family members of, and entities controlled by,
113
disqualified persons also are “disqualified” under § 4958.
Again, the precise definitions and rules are more complex, but
as one might suspect an “excess benefit transaction” generally is
defined as follows: a transaction whereby (1) an economic benefit
is provided by an organization, directly or indirectly, to or for the
use of a disqualified person, and (2) the value of the economic
benefit provided by the organization to or for the use of the
disqualified person exceeds the value of the consideration received
114
In other
by the organization in return for providing the benefit.
words, an excess benefit transaction is one in which a tax-exempt
organization does not receive equivalent value in return for
benefits provided to an influential person (or his family or
controlled entities) associated with the organization. A simple
example of an excess benefit transaction is paying unreasonable
115
compensation to an exempt organization’s Executive Director.
An excess benefit transaction may be found even where the
tax-exempt organization did not authorize any payment to the
disqualified person. For instance, embezzlement constitutes an
excess benefit transaction; but any associated excise taxes should be
imposed only upon the offending disqualified person—assuming
management was not aware of the embezzlement and takes steps to
116
The
recover the funds once the embezzlement is discovered.
rules of § 4958 thus are quite strict, but Treasury regulations offer
some comfort by enumerating certain “rebuttable presumption”
procedures that, if followed, allow an exempt organization to

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1)–(a)(2) (2011).
See id. § 4958(f).
Id. § 4958(c)(1)(A).
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(2)(iv) ex. 2 (2007).
LAWRENCE M. BRAUER ET AL., I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO I.R.C. § 4958 (INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS) 264 (2002), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopich02.pdf.
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safeguard against a finding of an excess benefit transaction. The
regulations also provide exceptions to § 4958 for retirement plans,
118
fringe benefits, and certain other payments.
Although the Treasury regulations under § 4958 provide
significant guidance as to what is and what is not an excess benefit
transaction, the regulations do not specifically address rules
applicable to “revenue-sharing” arrangements.
Previously
proposed regulations under § 4958, however, did address such
arrangements and set forth a slightly modified test for determining
119
whether they would be treated as excess benefit transactions.
Under the proposed regulations, a “revenue-sharing transaction” is
defined as one in which an economic benefit provided to or for the
use of a disqualified person is determined in whole or in part by
120
The
the revenues of one or more activities of the organization.
proposed regulations, like the final regulations, stated that a facts
and circumstances analysis generally would apply to determine if
121
The proposed
any arrangement gives rise to excess benefits.
regulations went further, though, to provide that if the benefit in
question was compensation, then regardless of whether the
revenue-sharing arrangement exceeded fair market value under
the circumstances, the arrangement constituted an excess benefit
transaction if at any time it permitted a disqualified person to
receive additional compensation without providing proportionate
122
additional services. The proposed regulations also stated that the
ability of an affected disqualified person to control the outcome of
the revenue-sharing arrangement would influence the analysis as to
whether the arrangement would constitute an excess benefit
123
transaction.
As noted above, the final regulations under § 4958 omitted any

117. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (2007).
118. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(4).
119. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5(a), 63 Fed. Reg. 41486, 41492 (Aug. 4,
1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1998-08-04/html/9820419.htm.
120. Id.
121. Compare Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a), with Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5(a),
63 Fed. Reg. 41486, 41492 (Aug. 4, 1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys
/pkg/FR-1998-08-04/html/98-20419.htm.
122. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5(a), 63 Fed. Reg. 41486, 41503 (proposed
Aug. 4, 1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1998-0804/html/98-20419.htm.
123. See id.
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specific rules addressing revenue-sharing arrangements.
Thus,
until final regulations on revenue-sharing transactions are issued,
such arrangements will be evaluated under the same principles
(i.e., generally, a facts and circumstances analysis) that apply to all
excess benefit transactions between a disqualified person and an
125
exempt organization.
5.

Unrelated Business Income and Unrelated Business Income Tax

Although organizations that are exempt under § 501(c)(3)
generally are not subject to federal or state income taxes, such
organizations are subject to the unrelated business income (“UBI”)
rules and the unrelated business income tax (“UBIT”). Section
512(a) imposes a separate tax on the gross income (less directly
and certain indirectly connected expenses) derived by an exempt
126
Although a
organization from an “unrelated trade or business.”
detailed discussion of the UBI rules is beyond the scope of this
127
article, a basic understanding of these rules is relevant to the
analysis of The People’s Market project.
Basically, three elements determine whether an activity
constitutes an unrelated trade or business subject to UBIT: the
activity must be (1) a trade or business, (2) regularly carried on,
and (3) not substantially related to the organization’s exempt
128
Exempt organizations report UBI and calculate UBIT
purpose.
129
on IRS Form 990-T.
A trade or business generally is defined as any activity carried
on for the “production of income from the sale of goods or the
130
The phrase “production of income
performance of services.”
124. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5(a) (stating “reserved”).
125. See id.
126. I.R.C. § 512(a) (2006).
127. I.R.S. Publication 598, which was revised in March of 2010, is a good,
general reference source for the UBI rules. See generally I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, PUB. NO. 598, TAX ON UNRELATED BUSINESS INCOME OF EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS (2010).
128. See I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(a) (2007).
129. See I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM 990-T: EXEMPT ORGANIZATION
BUSINESS INCOME TAX RETURN, CAT. NO. 11291J (2010). Section 501(c)(3)
organizations also must make their Form 990-T available for public inspection.
I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1) (2006).
130. I.R.C. § 513(c) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b). The fragmentation rule,
the exploitation rule, and the dual use rule also are important to the “trade or
business” analysis, but because they are not particularly relevant here, any
discussion of these rules is omitted. See generally HILL & MANCINO, supra note 40,
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from sale of goods or performance of services” is broadly
interpreted by the Service and the courts such that virtually any
income-producing activity beyond mere passive investment will be
131
considered a trade or business.
Trade or business activities are “regularly carried on” if they
are frequent and continuous and conducted in a manner that is
132
comparable to commercial activities of for-profit organizations.
On the other hand, if income-producing activities are conducted
infrequently or intermittently by an exempt organization, then they
do not meet the “regularly carried on” requirement. For example,
a once-a-year bake sale conducted by a local PTA chapter is not
considered “regularly carried on.” The sale of advertising in an
annual yearbook, however, is considered “regularly carried on”
133
where there is a solicitation program during the entire year.
Whether an activity is “substantially related” depends upon the
connection between the activity and the organization’s exempt
purpose or purposes. If the activity contributes importantly (other
than by generating revenue) or directly furthers the organization’s
exempt purpose, the income produced by the activity is not UBI.
For example, the sale of greeting cards displaying printed
reproductions of selected works from a folk museum’s collection
was determined by the Service to be substantially related to the
museum’s exempt purpose; however, the sale of science books by
the same folk museum was determined to be unrelated, thereby
producing UBI, even though such sales by a science museum would
134
serve an educational purpose consistent with § 501(c)(3).
Sections 512(b), 513, and 514 provide numerous specific
exclusions from, and modifications to, UBI for certain types of
135
A discussion of all of these exclusions and
revenue.
modifications is beyond the scope of this article; however, the
rental income exclusion and the unrelated debt-financed income
modification are relevant and are summarized below.

¶¶ 22.02[2], 22.09, 22.10.
131. HILL & MANCINO, supra note 40, ¶ 22.02[1].
132. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1).
133. See id. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(ii).
134. Rev. Rul. 73-105, 1973-1 C.B. 264.
135. I.R.C. §§ 512(b), 513, 514 (2006).
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Rental Income Exclusion

Rental income from real property generally is excluded from
136
UBI. This exclusion is not a blanket exception, though, and it is
limited strictly to real property and to rents from incidental
personal property leased with real property (not exceeding ten
137
The exception does not apply to rent
percent of total rent).
138
Further, this exception applies
solely from personal property.
only to passive rental activities that do not involve rendering any
significant services to the occupant. Under the regulations,
cleaning services are viewed as significant, so payments for lodging
139
The exception likewise does
in a hotel are not considered rent.
not apply if the rents are based in whole or in part on the income
or profits derived by any person from the leased property (other
than an amount based upon a fixed percentage of gross receipts or
140
This is an important distinction, since rental formulas
sales).
based upon net profits are customary for commercial leases.
7.

Unrelated Debt-Financed Income Modification

Income that otherwise would be exempt (e.g., rental income)
nevertheless is taxable as UBI if the income is not substantially
related to an organization’s exempt purpose and is derived from
property that is subject to “acquisition indebtedness.” Acquisition
indebtedness exists with respect to property if any of the following
conditions are found: (1) debt is incurred to acquire or improve
property; (2) debt is incurred before the property was acquired if it
would not have been incurred but for the planned acquisition; or
(3) debt is incurred after the property is acquired if the debt would
not have been incurred but for the acquisition of the property and
the need for such debt was reasonably foreseeable when the

136. Id. § 512(b)(3). As only the Internal Revenue Code can do, the exclusion
from UBI for rental income actually is contained in a section of the statute entitled
“modifications.” Then, I.R.C. § 513 contains a number of “exclusions” that may be
more accurately referred to as modifications (because they “modify” the
calculation of UBIT by removing income from a volunteer business, a thrift shop,
and other sources). Because these statutory labels are more confusing than
helpful in the context of this summary, the author has not adopted those labels for
this discussion.
137. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(c)(2)(ii)(b) (2011).
138. Id. § 1.512(b)-1(c)(2)(ii).
139. Id. § 1.512(b)-1(c)(5).
140. Id. § 1.512(b)-1(c)(2)(iii)(b).
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141

property was acquired.
Further, the income is taxable as UBI
whether the acquisition indebtedness is outstanding at the time
such income is produced or within the previous twelve-month
142
This type of taxable UBI from encumbered property is
period.
commonly referred to as unrelated debt-financed income.
There are several exceptions to the debt-financed rules that
result in income from encumbered property nevertheless being
143
excluded from UBI, but further discussion of these exceptions is
beyond the scope of this article. Furthermore, special rules apply
to determine the portion of income from debt-financed property
that must be included in UBI, but an analysis of these rules also is
144
outside the scope of this article.
C. Application of Exempt Organization Rules to The People’s Market
It should be obvious—perhaps almost painfully obvious—to
the reader at this point that organizing and operating TPM Owner
as a tax-exempt nonprofit corporation is problematic, if not
impossible, especially if Sam desires to issue participating debt to
himself and his friends and family. The prohibitions on private
inurement and private benefit prohibit tax-exempt status for an
145
Further,
organization that issues equity-like debt to insiders.
payments received by Sam and his family (although perhaps not by
his friends if they do not occupy positions of influence with TPM
Owner, Inc.) likely would be subject to excise taxes under the
excess benefit rules of § 4958. Furthermore, the UBI rules likely
would treat as disguised service income the “rent” received by TPM
Owner, Inc. from the retail businesses locating in The People’s
Market, especially if TPM Owner, Inc. provides substantial services
(e.g., cleaning, consulting, advertising, recycling, etc.) in
connection with the leases. Alternatively, since the income is based
in part upon the net revenues of the retail businesses located in
The People’s Market, such income would not meet the technical
rules defining rent for UBIT purposes. In either case, then, TPM
Owner, Inc.’s income could be subject to UBIT, thereby defeating
one of the principal reasons for seeking tax-exempt status. Last,
but not least, even assuming the income paid to TPM Owner, Inc.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
I.R.C. § 514(b)(1) (2006).
See id. § 514(b)–(c).
See id. § 514(a)(1)–(3).
See supra notes 73–109 and accompanying text.
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by the retail businesses could be restructured to qualify as rent
within the rental income exception to the UBI rules, because the
income is debt-financed, it potentially would become taxable as
UBIT under the unrelated debt-financed rules unless TPM Owner,
Inc. could demonstrate that the income is substantially related to
its exempt purpose.
All of the foregoing obstacles to organizing and operating
TPM Owner as a tax-exempt nonprofit corporation point to some
other form of organization for The People’s Market.
IV. TPM OWNER AS A FOR-PROFIT LLC
As mentioned previously, Sam could organize and operate
TPM Owner as a normal limited liability company or, perhaps, even
146
Because organizing and operating TPM Owner as an
as an L3C.
LLC (“TPM Owner, LLC”) follows a much more traditional path
for a commercial real estate project, this article does not extensively
147
discuss all of the legal pros and cons of such an approach.
Rather, this article summarizes the principal advantages and
disadvantages as contrasted with using the tax-exempt nonprofit
approach. Following that discussion, this article proceeds with a
brief analysis of financing TPM Owner, LLC in part with programrelated investments.
A. Advantages and Disadvantages of Forming TPM Owner as a ForProfit LLC
The principal advantages associated with organizing and
operating TPM Owner as an LLC primarily consist of avoiding the

146. This article will not address the relative advantages or disadvantages of
forming TPM Owner as an L3C versus an LLC. See sources cited supra note 12 for
commentary both for and against the use of L3Cs. In particular, with regard to
the balancing of fiduciary duties of managers as between LLCs and L3Cs, see
Tyler, supra note 12, for an excellent and thorough discussion.
147. This article also does not discuss other “social enterprise” organizations
that might be used for The People’s Market such as a corporation or a general or
limited partnership. For a good discussion of these other legal vehicles for social
enterprise, see Fei, supra note 3. Generally, though, in the author’s experience, an
LLC is the default choice for most for-profit enterprises absent a compelling
reason (such as the demands of venture capital investors) to choose some other
form of for-profit entity. For a general discussion of relevant choice of entity
considerations in the for-profit context, see BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8, ¶
1.09.
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148

disadvantages of tax-exempt status:
• The time consuming and costly process of applying for and
maintaining exempt status.
• The onerous restrictions associated with exempt status (such as
public disclosure of IRS Form 990, no political activities, no
lobbying, no private inurement, no private benefit, etc.).
• No requirement to publicly disclose the organization’s income
tax returns.
• Private ownership and equity participation clearly are
permitted.
• State-law “fundraising” restrictions are inapplicable (although
securities law applies).
• Attorney general supervision and interference is not avoided,
but is less common than in the case of nonprofit
organizations.
Forming TPM Owner as a for-profit LLC also has certain
149
disadvantages:
• Contributors to TPM Owner, LLC will not be entitled to an
income tax deduction.
• The members of TPM Owner, LLC will be taxable on their
distributable shares of the income from TPM Owner, LLC (but
they also may be able to use any losses generated by TPM
Owner, LLC to offset other income).
• TPM Owner, LLC will be subject to applicable sales, use, and
property taxes.
• TPM Owner, LLC will not benefit from the “halo” effect and
the public’s presumption of trustworthiness that usually are
bestowed upon a tax-exempt nonprofit.
• In addition to the fact that contributors to TPM Owner, LLC
will not be entitled to an income tax deduction, TPM Owner,
LLC generally will not be eligible for private foundation grants;
however, government grants may be available, and under
narrow circumstances TPM Owner, LLC could receive private
foundation grants, especially in the form of program-related
investments.
• TPM Owner, LLC will not benefit from any tort shield—“Good
Samaritan”—protection.
• TPM Owner, LLC generally will not qualify for the “volunteer”

148.
149.

See supra notes 50–68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69–89 and accompanying text.
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exception under FLSA and other employment laws.
B. Program-Related Investments (PRIs)
150

Under § 4944(a) and (b), if a private foundation “[i]nvests
any amount in such a manner so as to jeopardize the carrying out
of any of its exempt purposes,” then a tax is imposed on such
private foundation in an amount of ten percent of the jeopardizing
investment (with the possibility of an additional tax of twenty-five
percent if the jeopardizing investment is not corrected in a timely
fashion). Section 4944 may impose a tax on foundation managers
as well. These excise taxes effectively prohibit private foundations
from making extremely risky or imprudent investments.
Section 4944 was created in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 to
curb abusive or extremely risky investment-related activities
undertaken by private foundations. But an exception to the
general prohibition in § 4944 for extremely risky or seemingly
151
Pursuant to §
imprudent investments was created for PRIs.
4944(c), no jeopardizing investment excise tax is imposed on any
investment “the primary purpose of which is to accomplish one or
152
more of the purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(B), and no
significant purpose of which is the production of income or the
appreciation of property.” In addition, Treasury Regulation §
53.4944-3(a)(1)(iii) imposes an additional requirement on PRIs:
“[n]o purpose of the investment is to accomplish one or more of
153
Section
the purposes described in § 170(c)(2)(D).”
154
restricts activities that involve influencing
170(c)(2)(D)
legislation and participating in political campaigns. In short, PRIs
may not support lobbying or political campaign activities.
By enacting § 4944(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, Congress
recognized that private foundations may carry out their exempt
activities through means other than providing outright grants. The
Treasury has followed Congress’s legislative directive by
promulgating regulations with helpful (albeit old) examples of
155
PRIs, and the Service has ruled on numerous occasions that PRIs
may take the form of loans to qualifying organizations or
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

I.R.C. § 4944(a)–(b) (2006).
Id. § 4944(c).
Id.
I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(iii) (2010).
I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D).
See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(c).
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156

individuals
as well as equity investments in certain business
157
entities. As recently as 2006, the Service ruled favorably on a PRI
that was structured as an LLC venture fund established to make
investments in start-up enterprises in order to further economic
158
development and education by supporting entrepreneurs.
Nevertheless, PRIs are rarely used. It is estimated that less
than one percent of the approximately $90 billion expended each
159
There are
year by private foundations takes the form of PRIs.
several reasons why PRIs are relatively scarce.
First, unlike grants to public charities, PRIs are subject to the
160
and thus require the
taxable expenditure rules of § 4945
161
investing foundation to exercise “expenditure responsibility.” To
comply with the expenditure responsibility rules of § 4945, a
private foundation generally must undertake all reasonable efforts
and establish adequate procedures to: (1) see that the PRI is spent
only for the purpose for which it is made; (2) obtain full and
complete reports from the recipient organization on how the funds
are spent; and (3) make full and detailed reports on the PRI to the
162
Most private foundations simply want to make grants to
Service.
public charities without having to engage in the due diligence,
monitoring, and reporting required for expenditure responsibility.
Further, unlike grants, PRIs conceivably can produce
unrelated business taxable income (“UBTI”) depending upon how
the PRI is structured. Because interest normally qualifies for an
163
exception to the UBI rules, PRIs structured as loans typically do
156. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-90, 1978-1 C.B. 380 (ruling that PRIs include loans to
blind persons unable to obtain loans through commercial sources); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 8225073 (Mar. 24, 1982) (concluding that a loan for the construction of a
hotel in a blighted area was a PRI); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul 200034037 (May 31, 2000)
(holding that below-market loans to foreign media entities are PRIs).
157. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199943044 (Jul. 26, 1999) (ruling that a
private foundation may own a for-profit entity’s stock as a PRI); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 8526084 (Apr. 5, 1985) (holding that the acquisition by a private foundation
of an equity interest in a newly formed corporation to create employment
opportunities in an economically depressed area was a PRI).
158. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200610020 (Dec. 13, 2005).
159. Steven Lawrence, Doing Good with Foundation Assets: An Updated Look at
Program-Related Investments, in THE PRI DIRECTORY: PROGRAM RELATED INVESTMENTS
AND LOANS BY FOUNDATIONS xiii, xiii (Jeffrey A. Falkenstein & David G. Jacobs eds.,
3d ed. 2010); Ragin, supra note 13, at 57.
160. I.R.C. § 4945 (2006).
161. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(a)(1) (2010).
162. Id. § 53.4945-5(b)(1)(i–iii).
163. See I.R.C. § 512(b)(1) (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
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not generate UBTI, but certain equity investments, particularly in
164
partnerships and LLCs (including L3Cs), could generate UBTI.
Arguably, a PRI that is “substantially related” to the tax-exempt
purpose of the investing private foundation, including an equity
investment in an LLC or L3C, should not give rise to UBTI because
165
the income would not be from an “unrelated” trade or business.
This also should be the result if the underlying LLC or L3C has
debt financing in place. (Oddly, however, the author has found no
clear, black-letter law statement of this seemingly fundamental
principle.) The possibility of generating UBTI thus undoubtedly
discourages PRIs among private foundations.
In other respects, however, PRIs can be superior to outright
grants. First, like grants, PRIs (including administrative costs
incurred in making them) count toward a private foundation’s
annual five percent minimum distribution requirement under §
166
Yet, as distinguished from grants, PRIs hold the very real
4942.
promise of being repaid and perhaps even earning a profit.
Second, under § 4940, interest and dividends on PRIs constitute
gross investment income for purposes of the two percent annual
excise tax on private foundations, but capital gains on PRIs are
167
Accordingly, PRIs have a distinct tax advantage to
excluded.
private foundations. Third, PRIs qualify as an exception to the
excess business holdings rule of § 4943, which generally prohibits
private foundations from owning more than twenty percent (but
168
Finally,
less than one hundred percent) of a for-profit business.
because they generally require repayment of some kind, PRIs may
encourage greater accountability than grants, which ordinarily are
169
not required to be repaid by the recipient organization.
But PRIs may have additional significant drawbacks. For
example:
The main problem with PRIs, and the main reason why
164. A discussion of the interrelationship between unrelated business taxable
income and PRIs is beyond the scope of this article. See generally HILL & MANCINO,
supra note 40, ¶¶ 12.02, 21.01–26.06 (discussing tax consequences of the
investments of private foundations and unrelated business income).
165. See I.R.C. § 512.
166. I.R.C. § 4942 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-3(a)(2) (as amended in
1986).
167. I.R.C. § 4940 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 53.4940-1(f) (as amended in 1992).
168. I.R.C. § 4943 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-10(b) (1977).
169. For a more thorough discussion comparing and contrasting grants and
PRIs, see James P. Joseph & Andras Kosaras, New Strategies for Leveraging Foundation
Assets, TAX’N EXEMPTS, July–Aug. 2008, at 22, 22.
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they are not more prevalent, is that there is no
inexpensive route through which private foundations
can . . . be confident that they have met [and will continue
to meet all the] applicable [legal] requirements.
Currently, the only truly safe route to making a PRI is
either to (1) . . . [obtain] a private letter ruling from the
IRS or (2) obtain an opinion of knowledgeable tax
counsel. The primary difficulty with private letter rulings
is that they take months to be issued and they are very
costly in terms of legal fees. [Similarly,] an opinion of tax
counsel generally is expensive as well. Furthermore, a
legal opinion is not binding upon the IRS, and the IRS is
free to disagree with the opinion and challenge the PRI.
Because the stakes are very high [with PRIs] (i.e., an
investment that does not satisfy the PRI requirements of
Section 4944(c) would result in imposition of the excise
tax and possibly a loss of tax-exempt status), and because
of the time and cost involved in obtaining a legal opinion
or private letter ruling, most private foundations [avoid
170
PRIs altogether].
C. Financing The People’s Market with a $6 Million PRI
As noted above, to launch The People’s Market, Sam must find
$6 million in financing in addition to the $4 million to be invested
in TPM Owner, LLC by himself and by his friends and family. Two
of Terminus’s private foundations are willing to provide this
financing, but they are extremely resistant to providing the funds to
TPM Owner, LLC via a PRI. These private foundations remain
resistant even though Sam can point to a very similar PRI loan
made to a for-profit entity as described in a Treasury regulation
171
Furthermore,
example that has been law for roughly forty years.
Sam’s argument for the appropriateness of a PRI loan for The
People’s Market is bolstered by a recent ABA Tax Section
submission to the Service proposing more modern examples of

170. Brewer & Rhim, supra note 7, at 12–13. Although not discussed further
here, this common aversion to PRIs was the impetus behind the creation of the
L3C. The state-law requirements for organizing and operating an L3C dovetail
with the requirements for a valid PRI; however, this seemingly simple solution has
its problems and complexities as well. For further information, see sources cited
supra note 12.
171. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b) ex. 5 & 6 (1972) (authorizing below-marketrate loans to encourage businesses to operate in economically depressed areas).
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172

PRIs.
Nevertheless, Foundations One and Two, although
supportive of The People’s Market project, remain unwilling to
make a PRI loan to TPM Owner, LLC and will not expend the
funds necessary to obtain a legal opinion or a private letter ruling.
Even if Terminus’s two supportive private foundations might
consider simply granting the funds over time to TPM Owner,
LLC—grants to for-profit organizations are permitted—such grants
nonetheless would require compliance with the expenditure
173
For this reason, Foundations One
responsibility rules of § 4945.
and Two are unwilling to grant funds to TPM Owner, LLC.
Absent the foregoing grants or PRI loans, no other source can
be found to provide the remaining $6 million in capital that Sam
needs. As a result, Sam has concluded that the for-profit model for
The People’s Market is inadequate.
V. TPM OWNER AS A “CONTRACT HYBRID”
Although it is possible for The People’s Market to be owned
and operated by either a tax-exempt nonprofit or a for-profit entity,
neither model is optimal. The nonprofit model is appealing as a
traditional, “tried and true” approach, but it forces Sam to forgo
one of his primary commitments underlying the project: equity
participation by Sam and his friends and family. The for-profit
model permits equity participation, but because of legal
uncertainties and associated tax compliance, the for-profit model
eliminates any financing from Terminus’s two interested private
foundations. If Sam is unwilling to compromise in order to fit
neatly within either the nonprofit or for-profit models, then
perhaps a “contract hybrid” is the solution.
As previously noted in this article, LLCs are extraordinarily
174
flexible legal entities. An LLC is permitted to have managers that
are not members and members that have no economic rights but
do have voting rights. Unlike a corporation, where natural persons
must comprise its board of directors, an LLC may have a juridical
entity, such as another LLC, serve as its manager with the power
and authority to direct and control the activities of the underlying
172. Letter from Stuart M. Lewis, Chair, ABA Section of Taxation, to Hon.
Douglas Shulman, Comm’r, I.R.S. (Mar. 3, 2010), in ABA Members Propose
Additional Charitable Program-Related Investment Examples, TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar. 5,
2010, available at 2010 TNT 43-16 (LexisNexis).
173. I.R.C. § 4945 (2006).
174. See supra Part I.
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175

LLC.
In addition, LLCs that have only one member owning an
economic membership interest are disregarded for income tax
purposes, even where the same LLC may have other members
without economic interests but who vote and otherwise influence
176
In fact, with respect to an LLC wholly
the activities of the LLC.
owned by a charitable organization, as noted above, the Service
determined in 2010 that such an LLC may receive grants from
private foundations without requiring the private foundations to
177
exercise expenditure responsibility.
With the foregoing in mind, suppose the following structure is
implemented to launch The People’s Market project: Sam will form
TPM Owner, LLC to acquire and renovate the abandoned
warehouse and to rent space to the participating retail businesses.
Sam and his friends and family will capitalize TPM Owner, LLC
178
Sam
with $4 million and will be the only “economic” members.
and two other economic members will serve as the managers of
TPM Owner, LLC and will direct its day-to-day activities. TPM
Owner, LLC will finance, via a $6 million loan as described below,
the remaining amount needed to acquire and renovate the
warehouse that will house The People’s Market. As stated in its
operating agreement, the purpose of TPM Owner, LLC will be to
own and operate The People’s Market as envisioned by Sam;
therefore, distributable profits to the economic members may be
less than one might expect in a normal commercial real estate
LLC. To the greatest extent legally permissible, the operating
agreement will exculpate and indemnify Sam and the other two
managers for pursuing the quasi-charitable purpose of the LLC
179
The operating agreement for
over pure revenue generation.
TPM Owner, LLC also will address capital calls, allocations and
distributions to the members, buy-sell rights, transfer restrictions,
and other terms common to operating agreements for a
commercial real estate project.
In many respects, then, TPM Owner, LLC will resemble most
175. BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8, ¶ 7.04[3][a].
176. Id. ¶ 2.07[1].
177. I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2010-0052 (June 25, 2010).
178. As explained further below, “economic” members participate in
allocations and distributions from an LLC and are treated as the owners of the
LLC for income tax purposes. See generally BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8, ¶
1.04[5] (discussing the LLC as a bankruptcy remote entity or special purpose
vehicle).
179. For a general discussion, see Tyler, supra note 12.
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LLCs formed to acquire, own, and lease real estate. Importantly,
however, the operating agreement for TPM Owner, LLC will be
modified to accommodate a special, noneconomic voting member
in addition to Sam and his friends and family: Foundation
Member, LLC. As a noneconomic voting member of TPM Owner,
LLC, Foundation Member, LLC will not be entitled to any
allocations or distributions of income or losses from TPM Owner,
LLC. As provided in the TPM Owner, LLC operating agreement,
however, Foundation Member, LLC will be entitled to virtually all
other rights and privileges of being a member of an LLC, including
voting and approval rights, the right to inspect books and records,
the right to receive financial statements, and (as discussed further
below) certain special approval and veto rights over the actions of
180
For
Sam and the other two managers of TPM Owner, LLC.
instance, as long as it is a member, the operating agreement of
TPM Owner, LLC could provide that Foundation Member, LLC
must consent to any action that would alter the fundamental nature
of The People’s Market as a neighborhood-revitalization and jobcreation vehicle that also is environmentally friendly. Foundation
Member, LLC also could have the right to approve any future
financings or refinancings of TPM Owner, LLC; the admission of
other members to TPM Owner, LLC; and any other “major
decisions” as defined in the operating agreement of TPM Owner,
LLC. It is important to note, in this regard, that although
Foundation Member, LLC will have substantial control rights with
respect to TPM Owner, LLC—because it is a member and not a
manager, and TPM Owner, LLC is manager-managed—Foundation
Member, LLC will owe no fiduciary duties to the other members of
181
TPM Owner, LLC in exercising its rights as a member.
Foundation Member, LLC will be a newly formed LLC owned
182
entirely by Terminus Community Loan Fund, Inc. (“TCLF”).
Furthermore, Foundation Member, LLC itself will have a unique
aspect to its formation and operation. Specifically, Foundation
Member, LLC will be capitalized with a small capital contribution
from TCLF of $10,000, a conditional $3 million pledge (not an
outright grant) from Foundation One, and a $3 million conditional
180. See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8, ¶ 1.04[5][b][i][C].
181. See id. ¶ 1.04[5][b][ii][B] (discussing the fiduciary duties that members
and managers of an LLC owe to members).
182. Conceivably, if TCLF were unwilling or unable, Foundation Member,
LLC could be owned entirely by TC.
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zero percent interest line of credit from Foundation Two.
The
pledge and line-of-credit agreements entered into by Foundation
One and Foundation Two will have discretionary limitations and
conditions upon each foundation fulfilling its financial
commitment. Most importantly, Foundations One and Two will
insist that they have ongoing approval rights over funds that are
advanced to TPM Owner, LLC as a loan from Foundation Member,
LLC. Therefore, TCLF has decided that Foundation Member, LLC
will have three initial non-member managers: one representative
from each of Foundations One and Two and one representative
from TCLF. If at any time either foundation no longer has a
representative appointed as a manager of Foundation Member,
LLC, such foundation may cease funding the project.
Accordingly, the operating agreement will grant day-to-day
control of Foundation Member, LLC to its three nonmember
managers (who may delegate authority to appointed officers). In
addition, the operating agreement will provide the greatest
possible exculpation and indemnification rights to the three
managers (and any appointed officers) of Foundation Member,
LLC. As the sole member, TCLF will retain sole right to appoint
and remove the managers, but TCLF understands that funding
from Foundations One and Two is conditional on those
foundations having representative managers. Further, as the sole
member, TCLF will be entitled to terminate and liquidate
Foundation Member, LLC at any time in its discretion; and in
connection with any such termination and liquidation, all of
Foundation Member, LLC’s remaining assets after payment of
liquidation expenses will be distributed to TCLF. TCLF also will be
entitled to transfer its membership interest in Foundation Member,
183. Foundations One and Two might be able to set aside $3 million each and
have those set-asides count as qualifying distributions under § 4942(g)(2)(B) of
the Internal Revenue Code. Under § 4942, private foundations generally are
required to distribute five percent of their funds annually or pay certain penalty
taxes. See I.R.C. § 4942(a)–(e) (2006). If certain conditions are met, set-asides
may count as a “qualifying distribution,” even if the funds are not actually released
to the eventual recipient. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-05-051 (Nov. 9, 2010)
(funds set aside to improve camp facilities over three-year period); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 2011-05-052 (Apr. 26, 2010) (funds set aside to provide technical support,
capacity building, and financing for five-year conservation easement project). In
any event, when the funds are provided to Foundation Member, LLC, either as a
grant from Foundation One or a loan from Foundation Two, for reasons
explained in detail below, those expenditures will count against the five percent
annual distribution requirement.
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LLC at any time to a third party.
Thereafter, Foundation Member, LLC will enter into a loan
agreement with TPM Owner, LLC, whereby if certain conditions
are met in the discretion of its three nonmember managers,
Foundation Member, LLC will advance up to $6 million in periodic
increments (like a standard construction loan) to TPM Owner,
LLC. When combined with the $4 million in capital contributed by
Sam and his friends and family (which will be expended first), the
$6 million commitment provided by Foundation Member, LLC will
round out the capital needed to fund The People’s Market project.
The loan will be full recourse to TPM Owner, LLC, will be secured
by a first mortgage on the to-be-renovated warehouse and the
underlying real estate, and will bear interest at a below-market rate
of two percent. The two percent rate is meant to cover the
administrative and other costs TCLF will incur in connection with
making the loan. The loan agreement will prohibit, and will treat
as an event of default, any use of the funds for lobbying or political
activities.
An ownership diagram of The People’s Market project as soconceived is set forth below:
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A. Overview
The above-described “contract hybrid” structure for The
People’s Market obviously carries with it substantial complexity.
The critical question, though, is whether this added complexity
nevertheless achieves Sam’s objectives, especially his goal of raising
capital from both philanthropic and private sources. Before
delving into the specific pros and cons, though, there are a few key
aspects of the structure that deserve special emphasis.
1. Income Tax Treatment of TPM Owner, LLC and Foundation
Member, LLC
Initially, it is important to understand the federal income tax
184
treatment of TPM Owner, LLC and Foundation Member, LLC.
As a multimember LLC, TPM Owner, LLC will be treated as a
185
This means that
partnership for federal income tax purposes.
TPM Owner, LLC generally will not pay income taxes, but instead
the income earned by the enterprise will be allocated to the
members, and the members then will report and pay tax on their
186
This is why limited
respective shares of the enterprise’s income.
liability companies are commonly referred to as “flow-through” or
“pass-through” entities for income tax purposes.
A very simple example illustrates the point. Assume a taxexempt organization and unrelated wealthy individuals form an
investment fund as an LLC. The fund is set up to function purely
as a passive investment vehicle. The LLC thus invests in publicly
traded stocks and bonds and does not incur debt. The exempt
organization owns a ten percent membership interest in the LLC as
a portion of its normal endowment assets, while the wealthy
individuals own the remaining ninety percent of the LLC. If in a
given tax year the LLC earns $1,000 in capital gain income and
$100 in taxable interest income, then generally speaking $100 of
184. State income tax treatment is important to know as well but, for the sake
of convenience, this article assumes that in the case of TPM Owner, LLC and
Foundation Member, LLC, the state income tax treatment mirrors the federal
income tax treatment.
185. TPM Owner, LLC could elect corporate treatment, but such an election
would not be typical in a commercial real estate venture. See BISHOP &
KLEINBERGER, supra note 8, ¶ 2.01 (“Unincorporated, multi-member U.S. business
organizations have a ‘default classification’ as partnerships, unless they check-thebox to elect otherwise.”).
186. For a thorough discussion of limited liability companies and their income
tax attributes, see generally BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 8, ¶ 2.
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capital gain income and $10 of interest income will be allocated to
the exempt organization for tax purposes. Further, with respect to
the exempt organization, because the income (i.e., interest and
capital gain) falls within § 512 exceptions and is not debt-financed,
187
it is not subject to UBIT. The rest of the capital gain and interest
income will be allocated to the wealthy individuals who will pay
federal (and generally state) income taxes at their prevailing rates
on the income so allocated to them. In other words, the income of
the LLC “passes through” to its members who are responsible for
reporting and, if applicable, paying taxes on the income in
accordance with their particular tax status.
Next, it is critical to understand the federal income tax
treatment of Foundation Member, LLC. Although Foundation
Member, LLC is a member of TPM Owner, LLC, it is not a
“partner” of TPM Owner, LLC for federal income tax purposes.
Foundation Member, LLC has no economic interest in TPM
Owner, LLC, so Foundation Member, LLC is not entitled to
allocations or distributions of profits or losses from TPM Owner,
LLC. The LLC statutes of many states expressly permit this
188
When it comes to
separation of economic and other rights.
determining income and who is taxable on that income, federal tax
law generally focuses on economic rights, and not necessarily other
rights (e.g., voting, access to books and records, approval of
amendments). Foundation Member, LLC will be entitled to
interest and repayments of principal with respect to its loan to TPM
Owner, LLC, but it will receive those payments in its capacity as a
189
creditor, not as a member.
187. I.R.C. § 512(b) (2006).
188. See, e.g., DEL. CODE §§ 18-107, 18-301(d), 18-302(e) (2011) (providing for
the rights and obligations of LLCs, contribution requirements for admission into
LLCs, and amendment limits of LLC agreements); see also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER,
supra note 8, ¶ 1.04[5][b][ii][B] (“If state law indicates that only members may be
a party to the operating agreement and also provides that a person can be a
member without making a capital contribution, the remote creditor (or its
representative) may become a noneconomic member for purposes of protecting
the operating agreement from unwanted amendment.”).
189. This article does not attempt to address the debt-equity issues inherent in
the structure. Suffice it to say that if the loan from Foundation Member, LLC to
TPM Owner, LLC has all of the normal attributes of a standard commercial real
estate loan (regular payments of interest and principal, adequate security, stated
maturity date, etc.), it should be respected as debt, not equity. If, on the other
hand, the loan from Foundation Member, LLC to TPM Owner, LLC was a
“participating loan” as described previously in this article, then the debt-equity
issue would be much more sensitive. In this case, if the loan were re-characterized
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This ability to separate other rights from economic rights in an
LLC and have that separation recognized for federal income tax
purposes is relatively well accepted. For example, in Private Letter
Ruling 199914006, the Service held, in a similar loan arrangement
as described above, that a noneconomic member would not be
treated as a partner for federal income tax purposes, even though
the noneconomic member’s consent was required for the LLC to
(1) engage in any business activity beyond its stated purpose, (2)
file a voluntary petition for bankruptcy, (3) merge or consolidate
with any other entity, (4) sell substantially all of its assets, or (5)
190
amend its governing documents.
In addition, it is equally important to understand that because
Foundation Member, LLC is a single-member limited liability
company (i.e., its only member is TCLF), Foundation Member,
191
LLC is completely disregarded for federal income tax purposes.
In fact, Foundation Member, LLC will not even file a federal
income tax return because all of its profits and losses (if any) and
other activities will be reported on TCLF’s income tax return (IRS
192
That does not mean, however, that Foundation
Form 990).
Member, LLC is not respected for purposes other than federal
income taxation. Quite the opposite is true. Foundation Member,
LLC will possess all of the privileges of any LLC and generally will
be respected as an entity separate and apart from its sole member,
TCLF.
Thus, even though Foundation Member, LLC is
disregarded for income tax purposes, it can enter into contracts
(such as the loan to TPM Owner, LLC) and otherwise conduct
business.
Moreover, if Foundation Member, LLC operates
independently from TCLF, and not merely as its agent, then TCLF
will be protected from liability arising out of the activities of
193
The managers of Foundation
Foundation Member, LLC.
Member, LLC also may be protected from fiduciary liability to
as equity, then Foundation Member, LLC becomes a “partner” for income tax
purposes and the tax treatment of the entire structure falls apart. See generally
Carman & Bender, supra note 70 (discussing the debt-equity test to classify an
entity as a partner for federal income tax purposes).
190. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199914006 (Dec. 23, 1998).
191. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(i) (2011).
192. See Rev. Rul. 2004-77, 2004-2 C.B. 119; see, e.g., I.R.S., U.S. DEP’T OF THE
TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE R (FORM 990), CAT. NO. 51519M (2010).
193. See Cassady Brewer & Sean Reynolds, Business and Tax Planning with
Controlled Organizations, TAX’N EXEMPTS, July–Aug. 2007, at 3; Dominic Daher &
Barry Brents, Achieving Enhanced Liability Protection Through SMLLCs, TAX’N
EXEMPTS, Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 137.
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TCLF (the sole member) by exculpatory provisions in the
194
operating agreement of Foundation Member, LLC, and they may
be protected from third-party liability (such as to TPM Owner,
LLC) through indemnification provisions in Foundation Member,
195
LLC’s operating agreement.
2. TCLF and Private Foundations Have Control Without Fiduciary
Liability
There is a very important aspect of this structure that deserves
reiteration. TPM Owner, LLC is a manager-managed LLC. Its
managers, Sam and his two colleagues, will have fiduciary duties to
the members of TPM Owner, LLC (including Foundation Member,
LLC). Under many state LLC statutes, those fiduciary duties can
be modified and to some extent waived by TPM Owner, LLC’s
operating agreement, but as a member and signatory to the
operating agreement, Foundation Member, LLC will have control
over the breadth of any such modification or waiver of fiduciary
duties. Foundation Member, LLC also will have rights to financial
and other information from TPM Owner, LLC and may inspect the
books and records of TPM Owner, LLC. Moreover, Foundation
Member, LLC, as a member in a manager-managed LLC, will owe
no fiduciary duty whatsoever to the other members of TPM Owner,
LLC. Thus, Foundation Member, LLC generally can act entirely in
its own self-interest when deciding to exercise its rights under the
operating agreement of TPM Owner, LLC. This in turn allows
TCLF and Foundations One and Two to build into the operating
agreement of TPM Owner, LLC certain approval or other rights
that prohibit TPM Owner, LLC from behaving in a manner that is
inconsistent with its quasi-charitable purpose. These control
provisions in TPM Owner, LLC’s operating agreement help
safeguard the tax-exempt status of TCLF and Foundations One and
196
Two.
194. See, e.g., DEL. CODE § 18-1101(b) (2011); see also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER,
supra note 8, ¶¶ 1.04[5][b][ii][C], 7.09 (noting that every manager normally owes
a fiduciary duty of loyalty to members but that, when properly structured, the
members may modify in their operating agreement the duty of loyalty that the
creditor’s representative manager owes its members).
195. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. § 18-108 (2011); see also BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra
note 8, ¶ 10.08 (stating that enabling statutes generally authorize LLCs to
indemnify managers by including indemnification provisions in operating
agreements that delineate or restrict manager indemnification).
196. See sources cited supra note 194.
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The Loan Model Aligns with Established Precedent

Unlike either the nonprofit model or the for-profit model, and
despite its novelty, the hybrid model described above aligns with
established precedent. For instance, in Revenue Ruling 74-587, the
Service approved tax-exempt status for an organization that made
low-cost or long-term loans to business enterprises in economically
197
These loans were designed to “relieve poverty,
depressed areas.
eliminate prejudice, reduce neighborhood tensions, and combat
198
community deterioration” by encouraging entrepreneurship and
economic growth in the otherwise impoverished area. The
following statement from the Revenue Ruling is instructive:
Although some of the individuals receiving financial
assistance in their business endeavors under the
organization’s program may not themselves qualify for
charitable assistance as such, that fact does not detract
from the charitable character of the organization’s
program. The recipients of loans and working capital in
such cases are merely the instruments by which the charitable
199
purposes are sought to be accomplished.
This published ruling thus makes the very important and
established point that charitable purposes sometimes are best
accomplished through organizations that are not in and of
themselves charitable.
Another salient point about the contract hybrid described
herein is that the loan from Foundation Member, LLC to TPM
Owner, LLC is not a PRI, although it is purposely designed to be
200
As discussed above, a PRI is an investment
substantially similar.
(debt or equity, or even a guaranty) that meets the requirements of
201
Namely, it is an investment made primarily to
§ 4944(c).
accomplish a charitable purpose, not to generate a profit, and
would not have been made but for the accomplishment of that
202
charitable purpose. The loan from Foundation Member, LLC to
197. Rev. Rul. 74-587, 1974-2 C.B. 162.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
200. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b) ex. 5 (2011) (below-market interest rate
loan to publicly traded company to entice company to build manufacturing facility
in deteriorated urban area); id. § 53.4944-3(b) ex. 6 (below-market interest rate
loan to nonprofit community development corporation to market agricultural
products for low-income farmers in a depressed rural area).
201. See supra notes 150–70 and accompanying text.
202. I.R.C. § 4944(c) (2006). Lobbying and political expenditures also are
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TPM Owner, LLC is being made at a below-market interest rate to a
quasi-charitable project that has been unable to obtain any other
source of financing. Technically, though, the loan is not a PRI
203
Instead, for
because the lender is not a private foundation.
federal income tax purposes, the loan is treated as having been
made by TCLF, a public charity, through its wholly owned,
disregarded LLC subsidiary, Foundation Member, LLC. Pursuant
204
to Information Letter 2010-0052, any grants or loans made to
Foundation Member, LLC by Foundations One and Two, which in
turn fund the loan to TPM Owner, LLC, are treated as grants to a
public charity and do not require the exercise of expenditure
205
responsibility.
This conclusion really should be no surprise. There is ample
prior precedent to support the Service’s determination in
Information Letter 2010-0052 that a wholly-owned, disregarded
subsidiary of a public charity should be ignored for federal income
206
tax purposes, including with respect to grants to the subsidiary.
4.

The Conduit Rules of Section 4945

On the other hand, there are rules that prohibit a private
foundation from using a public charity as a mere conduit to funnel
prohibited for PRIs. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3.
203. See James Joseph, Program-Related Investments and You—Perfect Together,
TAX’N EXEMPTS, Mar.–Apr. 2010, at 10 (suggesting that PRI-like investments by
public charities create “sustainable” giving in a time when philanthropic dollars
are limited).
204. I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2010-0052 (Mar. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/10-0052.pdf; see also Mitchell Rogovin, The Four R’s
Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, and Retroactivity in the 21st Century: A View
from Within, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 323, 352 (2008) (“An information letter is a statement,
issued either by the Office of Chief Counsel or by the Service, which does no more
than call attention to a well-established interpretation or principle of tax law,
without applying it to a specific set of facts.”). The purpose of an information
letter is simply to impart general information to the individual or organization
seeking such information. Id. at 352–53. The government, however, is not bound
by any statements made within an information letter, as these letters are not
rulings. Id.
205. This remains true even though, as discussed below, the loan from
Foundation Two to Foundation Member, LLC is in fact a PRI.
206. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200606047 (Nov. 14, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
200538027 (Sept. 23, 2005); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200436022 (June 9, 2004); I.R.S.
Announcement 99-102, 1999-43 I.R.B. 545 (Oct. 25, 1999). A number of articles
also discuss the available planning possibilities through the use of single-member
LLCs owned by charitable organizations. See Brewer & Reynolds, supra note 193;
Daher & Brents, supra note 193.
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grants to private individuals and organizations without exercising
expenditure responsibility. Those rules conceivably could apply to
any grants being made to Foundation Member, LLC that are in
turn used to fund a loan to TPM Owner, LLC. Applicable
regulations provide as follows:
A grant by a private foundation to a grantee organization
which the grantee organization uses to make payments to
another organization (the secondary grantee) shall not be
regarded as a grant by the private foundation to the
secondary grantee if the foundation does not earmark the
use of the grant for any named secondary grantee and
there does not exist an agreement, oral or written,
whereby such grantor foundation may cause the selection
of the secondary grantee by the organization to which it
has given the grant. For purposes of this subdivision, a
grant described herein shall not be regarded as a grant by
the foundation to the secondary grantee even though
such foundation has reason to believe that certain
organizations would derive benefits from such grants so
long as the original grantee organization exercises
control, in fact, over the selection process and actually
makes the selection completely independently of the
207
private foundation.
At first glance, the above-quoted language seems damning.
Specifically, with respect to the contract hybrid structure described
herein, it is clear that Foundations One and Two will be making
208
grants to Foundation Member, LLC solely to allow it to fund the
loan to the “secondary grantee,” TPM Owner, LLC. This process
could be construed as “earmarking” the grant contrary to the
above-quoted regulation. Furthermore, pursuant to an operating
agreement, Foundations One and Two will have representatives
(appointed by TCLF) as two of the three managers of Foundation
Member, LLC. Such an arrangement certainly would seem to be
an “agreement” to cause the “selection of the secondary grantee” in
violation of the regulation such that Foundation Member, LLC will
not be acting “completely independently” of Foundations One and
Two.
The author believes, though, that the contract hybrid structure
described herein nevertheless is permitted and does not violate
207. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(a)(6) (2011).
208. Pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-4(a)(2) (2011), the term “grants” for
this purpose includes loans.
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either the “earmarking” prohibition or the “complete
independence” requirement of the regulations. The author’s
conclusion is based upon a careful reading of the regulations
209
and by comparing and contrasting two
under § 4945
accompanying examples in the regulations.
Moreover, as
explained below, the Service’s interpretation of the above-quoted
regulatory language and the accompanying examples in one very
illustrative Private Letter Ruling supports the author’s position.
a.

Regulatory Examples and Illustrative Private Letter Ruling

With respect to the prohibition on conduit grants through
public charities, the Treasury regulations under § 4945 set forth
substantially similar rules for testing grants to individuals and
grants to organizations. Treasury Regulation § 53.4945-4 concerns
210
conduit grants to individuals, while § 53.4945-5 concerns conduit
211
In particular, § 53.4945-4(a)(4)(iv) sets
grants to organizations.
forth two examples that illustrate the concepts of “earmarking” and
“complete independence” for purposes of determining whether a
public charity is a mere conduit for a grant that otherwise would
212
require expenditure responsibility.
213
In the first example, a tax-exempt university requests that a
private foundation grant the university $100,000 to hire an
exceptionally qualified biochemist. The foundation, after deciding
that it wishes to support the effort to hire the biochemist, grants
the university $100,000. The example states that even if the
foundation may withdraw the grant if the university is unable to
hire the specified biochemist, because the facts and circumstances
demonstrate that the university, not the foundation, initially
identified the biochemist, there is an “objective manifestation” that
the university is in control of the process and is not acting as a
mere conduit.
214
Conversely, in the second example, the facts show that there
209. I.R.C. § 4945 (2006).
210. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-4 (1972) (containing special rules relating to grants
for “travel, study, or other similar purposes” for individuals as opposed to a grant
to an indigent person to allow him or her to purchase furniture, although the
underlying principles relating to “earmarking” and “complete independence”
essentially are the same).
211. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5 (as amended in 1973).
212. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-4(a)(4)(iv).
213. Id. § 53.4945-4(a)(4)(iv) ex.1.
214. Id. § 53.4945-4(a)(4)(iv) ex.2.
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are a number of qualified biochemists and the foundation, not the
university, initially identifies the biochemist to be hired. Further,
the facts recite that the university is not authorized to keep the
grant funds if it is unable to hire the particular biochemist
identified by the foundation.
In this case, the facts and
circumstances demonstrate that the selection of the biochemist was
made by the foundation, not the university. Therefore, the
university is acting as a mere conduit, and the foundation must
comply with the expenditure responsibility rules of § 4945.
Private Letter Ruling 199943058 further illustrates how the
initial involvement of the public charity in the selection process
avoids the conduit prohibition, even where the selection of the
215
In this private
recipient is monitored by the private foundation.
ruling, a private foundation, Foundation X, proposed to establish a
loan program to facilitate start-up or expansion of businesses in a
foreign country, Country M. Because Country M was war-torn and
economically depressed, affordable growth capital there was
virtually nonexistent. Foundation X’s proposed loan program
consisted of two parts: a “government program” and a “direct loan
or investment program.” In the government program, Foundation
X would make a zero percent interest loan to the government of
Country M. Country M in turn would make loans to privately
owned banks within Country M. Those banks then would lend
funds to private enterprises to finance start-up businesses or
expansion and would charge reasonable rates of interest. Although
the government of Country M would select the local banks to
participate in the loan program, Foundation X retained the right
to approve the local banks chosen by the government before
funding the loans. The private ruling stated that Foundation X’s
purpose for reserving its approval rights was to ensure compliance
with the terms of the overall loan program between Foundation X
and the government of Country M. The private ruling also stated
that Foundation X would not exercise expenditure responsibility
over the funds advanced under the government loan program.
With respect to the direct loan program, Foundation X
proposed to make direct loans or equity investments in businesses
in Country M that need start-up or expansion capital. Foundation
X would select the eligible businesses in the direct loan program,
and Foundation X would exercise expenditure responsibility for the
215.

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199943058 (Aug. 6, 1999).
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direct loan program.
Foundation X sought a number of rulings with respect to its
loan program. Most of those rulings are not directly relevant to the
conduit prohibition discussed in this article, but they are
noteworthy. Specifically, the Service held that Foundation X’s
proposed loan program (1) would qualify as a permissible
charitable endeavor, (2) would not violate the self-dealing rules of
216
§ 4941, (3) would meet the qualified distribution rules of §
217
4942, (4) would be treated as a PRI so as not to constitute a
218
jeopardizing investment under § 4944, and (5) would not give
rise to UBIT (either because the loan program would be a
substantially related activity or any interest or gains derived from
219
Furthermore,
the loans would qualify for an exception to UBI).
220
in a follow-up private ruling relating to the fact that Foundation
X proposed to charge no interest on its loans, the Service
221
determined that §§ 483, 1273, 1274, and 7872 would not apply to
impute interest income to Foundation X. Otherwise, as a result of
the imputed interest, Foundation X would have been subject to the
tax on net investment income under § 4940 even though it had not
planned to charge interest on its loan to the government of
222
Country M.
With respect to the application of the expenditure
223
responsibility rules of § 4945, the Service applied a very precise
analysis to rule in favor of Foundation X with respect to both the
government loan program and the direct loan program. In
particular, the Service ruled that Foundation X’s proposed loan to
the government of Country M would constitute a PRI; however,
Foundation X was not required to exercise expenditure
responsibility with respect to this PRI because, pursuant to
applicable Treasury regulations, the government of Country M is
treated the same as a public charity for purposes of § 4945 so long
224
as the grant to the government is made for charitable purposes.
Therefore, because the government of Country M initially selected
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

I.R.C. § 4941 (2006).
I.R.C. § 4942 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
I.R.C. § 4944 (2006).
I.R.C. § 512(a), (b) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200036050 (June 13, 2000).
I.R.C. §§ 483, 1273, 1274, 7872 (2006).
I.R.C. § 4940 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
I.R.C. § 4945 (2006).
Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(a)(4)(iii) (2007).
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the local banks to participate in Foundation X’s government loan
program, Foundation X’s rights to monitor the selection process
and approve the selected banks did not violate the regulation’s
prohibition on using a public charity—in this case, the government
of Country M—as a mere conduit.
With respect to Foundation X’s proposed direct loan program,
the Service similarly determined that its loans would constitute
PRIs, but contrary to the government loan program, would require
the exercise of expenditure responsibility. The Service reasoned
that the direct loan program would require the exercise of
expenditure responsibility because Foundation X would choose the
eligible recipients rather than the government of Country M.
b. The Structure Does Not Violate the Conduit Rules of Section
4945
Similar to the selection processes described in the first
regulatory example mentioned above and in Private Letter Ruling
199943058, TCLF identified The People’s Market project and
approached Foundations One and Two for funding, not the
reverse. In addition, as its sole member, TCLF retains complete
control over Foundation Manager, LLC. TCLF has the right to
appoint and remove the managers of Foundation Member, LLC, as
well as the right to liquidate or transfer its ownership in
Foundation Member, LLC at any time, even though exercising
such rights will terminate funding by Foundations One and Two.
The author believes that such powers constitute an “objective
manifestation” of “completely independent” control over the grant
funds such that Foundations One and Two will not be treated as
having “earmarked” the funds for The People’s Market and thus
will not have violated the conduit rules of § 4945.
5. Could Foundation Member, LLC Be Considered a Donor Advised
Fund?
Another potential obstacle to using the contract hybrid
225
Section 4966 was enacted in
described in this article is § 4966.
2006 to curtail certain perceived abuses by donor advised funds
with respect to grants to individuals and non-charitable
organizations. This relatively new law imposes an excise tax on a

225.

I.R.C. § 4966 (2006).
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“sponsoring organization” for each “taxable distribution” it makes
226
It also imposes an excise tax on
from a “donor advised fund.”
any fund manager of the sponsoring organization that knowingly
227
Although it is important to
permitted the taxable distribution.
set forth herein the legal analysis as to why, in the author’s opinion,
§ 4966 does not apply to Foundation Member, LLC or The
People’s Market, the reader is forewarned that the analysis is very
technical. (Thus, the trusting reader may want to skip the next few
paragraphs.)
In general, under § 4966(c), a taxable distribution is “any
distribution from a donor advised fund” to any natural person, or
to any other person, if (1) the “distribution is for any purpose other
228
or (2) “the
than one specified in section 170(c)(2)(B),”
sponsoring organization [maintaining the donor advised fund]
does not exercise expenditure responsibility with respect to such
229
Under §
distribution in accordance with section 4945 (h).”
4966(c)(2), a taxable distribution does not include a distribution
from a donor advised fund to: (1) “any organization described in
section 170(b)(1)(A) (other than a disqualified supporting
organization),” (2) “the sponsoring organization of such donor
230
advised fund,” or (3) “any other donor advised fund.”
For these purposes, a “donor advised fund” is defined as:
[A] fund or account owned and controlled by a
sponsoring organization, which is separately identified by
reference to contributions of a donor or donors, and with
respect to which the donor, or any person appointed or
designated by such donor (‘donor advisor’), has, or
reasonably expects to have, advisory privileges with
231
respect to the distribution or investment of the funds.
A “sponsoring organization” is defined for this purpose as a §
170(c) organization that is not a governmental organization
(referenced in § 170(c)(1) and (2)(A)) or a private foundation
that maintains one or more donor advised funds.
226. Id. § 4966(a)(1).
227. Id. § 4966(a)(2).
228. Id. § 4966(c)(1)(B)(i) (identifying groups organized and operated for
charitable, religious, educational, and other specified exempt purposes).
229. Id. § 4966(c)(1)(B)(ii) (describing rules pertaining to the exercise of
expenditure responsibility).
230. Id. § 4966(c)(2).
231. Id. § 4966(d)(2), interpreted by I.R.S. Notice 2006-109, 2006-2 CB 1121,
superseded in other respects by Rev. Proc. 2009-32, 2009-28 I.R.B. 142.
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Conceivably, § 4966 could be read to treat TCLF as a
“sponsoring organization” and Foundations One and Two as
“donor advisors.” If that were the case, then Foundation Member,
LLC could be considered a “donor advised fund.” The loan from
Foundation Member, LLC thus would be a taxable expenditure
unless Foundation Member, LLC (for tax purposes, TCLF)
exercised expenditure responsibility with respect to the loan.
Sensibly, however, § 4966 contains an exception to the term
“donor advised fund” that is applicable here. Specifically, §
4966(d)(2)(B) provides that a donor advised fund does not include
a fund or account: (1) that makes distributions only to a single
identified organization or governmental entity or (2) with respect
to which a donor advises a sponsoring organization regarding
grants for travel, study, or similar purposes if certain further
232
Because Foundation Member, LLC is a
conditions are met.
“single identified organization” (which in turn is disregarded for
tax purposes such that TCLF actually is the relevant
“organization”), § 4966 should not apply to The People’s Market
233
project.
Having established that the contract hybrid described herein
complies with applicable law, an examination of the advantages
and disadvantages of the structure is in order. The following
discussion highlights the primary advantages and disadvantages,
especially as compared to the pure for-profit and nonprofit models.
B. Principal Advantages
The contract hybrid described herein preserves the ability for
donors to take charitable contribution deductions for their
donations to The People’s Market, albeit somewhat indirectly.
Those donors could contribute funds to TCLF, take an income tax
deduction for a contribution to a public charity, TCLF could
contribute the funds to the capital of Foundation Member, LLC,
and then cause Foundation Member, LLC to use the contribution
232. Id. § 4966(d)(2)(B).
233. For example, the Service interpreted this exception so as to exclude from
§ 4966 employer-sponsored disaster relief funds that follow certain standard
requirements for selecting beneficiaries. See I.R.S. Notice 2006-109, 2006-2 C.B.
1121, superseded in other respects by Rev. Proc. 2009-32, 2009-28 I.R.B. 142. Typically,
an employer-sponsored disaster relief fund receives contributions from the
employer and its employees. Id. § 1. In turn, through an independent selection
committee that uses objective criteria, the fund provides financial assistance to
employees and their families that are the victims of a major disaster. Id.
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to fund portions of the loan to TPM Owner, LLC. Logically,
donors should be able to contribute funds directly to Foundation
Member, LLC and obtain an income tax deduction since
Foundation Member, LLC is disregarded for income tax purposes;
however, the IRS has yet to rule publicly that a contribution to a
wholly-owned LLC subsidiary of a tax-exempt entity qualifies for the
234
charitable contribution deduction under § 170.
The interest payable on the loan by TPM Owner, LLC to
Foundation Member, LLC will qualify for an exception to UBI and
235
If Foundation Member, LLC
therefore will not constitute UBIT.
made an equity investment into TPM Owner, LLC, the rental
income from the retail businesses generally would not qualify for
an exception to UBIT because it is tied to net, as opposed to gross,
revenues. It also would be hard for TCLF to argue that the income
from TPM Owner, LLC flowing through Foundation Member, LLC
is “substantially related” to TCLF’s exempt purpose, which is
lending money to disadvantaged businesses, not acting as a
landlord.
As discussed in detail above, the contract hybrid described
herein does not require Foundation One or Foundation Two to
comply with the expenditure responsibility rules. This is true even
though Foundation Two’s loan to Foundation Member, LLC is a
PRI. Because TCLF is a public charity, and its wholly-owned
subsidiary, Foundation Member, LLC is disregarded, § 4945 does
236
Compliance with the expenditure responsibility rules
not apply.
of § 4945 is one of the more significant impediments to private
237
foundations using PRIs as part of their philanthropic mission.
The contract hybrid described herein avoids this impediment.
The contract hybrid also preserves the ability for Sam, his
friends, and his family to participate in the earnings and growth of
The People’s Market. Assuming The People’s Market is profitable,
then after payment of interest to Foundation Member, LLC, the
remaining profit will be allocable and distributable to the members
of TPM Owner, LLC. This accomplishes one of Sam’s central
objectives in conceiving The People’s Market.
234. See Letter from Charles H. Egerton, Chair, ABA Section of Taxation, to
Hon. Douglas Shulman, Comm’r, I.R.S. (July 25, 2011), available at
http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/aba-tax-section.pdf.
235. I.R.C. § 512(b)(1) (2006).
236. I.R.C. § 4945 (2010); see supra note 235 and accompanying text; infra
notes 239–47.
237. See Ragin, supra note 13.
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C. Principal Disadvantages
Complexity obviously is a significant disadvantage of the
contract hybrid described in this article. Two LLCs, instead of one,
will be required. The terms of the loan between Foundation
Member, LLC will be complicated. TPM Owner, LLC, TCLF, and
Foundations One and Two all may need legal and tax counsel to
even begin to get comfortable with the structure. In the author’s
experience, however, the level of complexity created by the
contract hybrid described herein is typical of most private
commercial real estate transactions. Thus, the cost in terms of
legal fees should not be out of the ordinary. On the other hand, as
can be seen from the discussion above, all of the special rules
applicable to tax-exempt organizations, especially private
foundations, must be taken into account in addition to the normal
complexities. Counsel must be familiar with these special rules and
engaging counsel with such expertise undoubtedly will increase
legal costs. Hopefully, this article goes a long way to provide
guidelines for knowledgeable counsel to follow. Regardless,
complexity is inevitable in balancing diverse and competing
interests of several parties to a transaction, and the contract hybrid
described herein unfortunately is no exception.
Perhaps the most significant disadvantage, which is one of the
most vexing issues that tax-exempt organizations must consider
when entering into complex transactions with for-profit
enterprises, is the private benefit prohibition. The private benefit
prohibition is discussed in significant detail elsewhere in this
238
article, so it will not be revisited here. As the reader will recall,
the essential question is whether TCLF and Foundations One and
Two have conferred an impermissible amount of private benefit
upon TPM Owner, LLC by entering into the financing of The
People’s Market. There is no question that some private benefit is
being bestowed upon Sam, his friends, and his family via TPM
Owner, LLC. Clearly, The People’s Market project could not be
launched without the financing provided by Foundations One and
Two. The test, however, is not whether any private benefit exists,
but whether any private benefit bestowed is “incidental”—in both a
qualitative and quantitative sense—to the overall public benefit
achieved.
There are no bright line rules to follow when
undertaking this analysis. Determining whether any private benefit
238.

See supra notes 81–109 and accompanying text.
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is incidental in a qualitative and quantitative sense is inherently a
facts and circumstances inquiry. As the Tax Court stated in Pulpit
Resource v. Commissioner with regard to the private benefit analysis:
“[I]t is apparent that the relevant facts in each individual case must
be strained through those [private benefit] principles to arrive at a
239
decision on the particular case.”
Tax-exempt organizations, particularly private foundations—
240
with some notable exceptions —are notoriously hesitant
241
concerning PRIs or PRI-like arrangements. Part of that hesitancy
stems from the need to comply with the expenditure responsibility
rules of § 4945. The contract hybrid structure described herein
242
Furthermore, only Foundation Two
eliminates that obligation.
has engaged in a PRI under our example, and the PRI consists of a
debt investment in a public charity. The author submits that such a
PRI—a zero percent interest loan to public charity to allow it to use
those funds in connection with its tax-exempt mission—does not
create a significant risk of private benefit.
The risk that TCLF has crossed the prohibited private benefit
threshold likewise seems to be very low. Even though the loan
from Foundation Member, LLC is not a PRI, it has all of the
elements: it is a last-resort, below-market interest rate loan designed
to further environmental sustainability, community revitalization,
and job creation in an economically depressed urban area. The
terms of the loan also prohibit use of the funds for lobbying or
political activities. If an investment by a public charity meets the
standards for a PRI, the author would argue that the risk of private
benefit in such a case is extremely low. At least one other
commentator has made the same argument:
The PRI rules offer useful guidance on how to structure
an investment by a public charity to ensure that the
investment qualifies as a charitable activity that will not be
subject to UBIT or constitute private benefit that
243
jeopardizes the public charity’s tax-exempt status.
As far as the author has uncovered, however, there is no black-letter
239. Pulpit Res. v. Comm’r, 70 T.C. 594, 612 (1978).
240. See Lawrence, supra note 159, at xv (listing by total amount invested over
the years of 2006 through 2007 the top twenty-five private foundations that made
PRIs during that period; the total PRIs made ranged from a high of approximately
$77.5 million to a low of approximately $6.7 million).
241. Ragin, supra note 13, at 56.
242. See supra notes 174–83 and accompanying text.
243. Joseph, supra note 201, at 11.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss2/5

58

Brewer: A Novel Approach to Using LLCs for Quasi-Charitable Endeavors (a/

736

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:2

law drawing the same conclusion, for example, that a valid PRI per
se cannot constitute private benefit. Therefore, impermissible
private benefit presumably remains a risk in the contract hybrid
structure described herein, but the level of risk certainly seems to
be relatively low.
VI. CONCLUSION
As previously established, there is no single-entity structure
that satisfies all the demands of the typical social entrepreneur.
Most social entrepreneurs want the best legal and tax attributes of
both the for-profit and nonprofit models for conducting business.
Such an entity currently does not exist, at least not in the United
244
By default, social entrepreneurs may choose the taxStates.
exempt nonprofit model, but for those who insist that private
ownership must be accommodated, the LLC is increasingly
becoming the entity of choice. Despite its tremendous flexibility,
however, a single LLC used to own and operate a social enterprise
usually is not enough.
Instead, like the Marines, creative
attorney/advisors to social entrepreneurs must “improvise, adapt,
245
and overcome” to meet the demands of their clients. Using
multiple LLCs and combinations of debt and equity to raise capital,
a contract hybrid structure potentially can be created to get close to
the “best of both worlds.” Nevertheless, such contract hybrids
inevitably result in substantial complexity, primarily because they
must pass through a maze of highly technical and extremely
punitive tax rules. The multiple LLC contract hybrid structure
proposed in this article is indeed complex, but in the right
circumstances could be an elegant solution for combining
philanthropic and private capital.

244. See Wood, supra note 22, at 46–48 (describing the L3C and the “CIC,”
Community Interest Corporation, that has been created under the laws of the
United Kingdom).
245. Glenn Knight, Improvise, Adapt and Overcome, AN UNOFFICIAL UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY FOR MARINES, http://4mermarine.com/USMC/dictionary/i.html (last
visited Oct. 30, 2011) (describing this phrase as the unofficial mantra of the
Marine Corps).
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